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Abstract 
This study investigates the sustainability disclosure effects of the introduction of the 
Companies Act 2006 Regulations 2013 in the United Kingdom. The regulation mandates the 
disclosure of information on greenhouse gas emissions, gender distribution and human rights 
issues. We examine two research questions: first, whether firms increased disclosure on the 
mandated topics after the regulation became effective relative to a control group, and second, 
whether a potential increase in disclosure is moderated by firms’ reporting incentives, namely, 
firms’ capital market visibility, growth orientation, governance structure, prior voluntary 
sustainability disclosure levels and critical media coverage. Our sample consists of the FTSE-
350 firms and a matched control group of US firms. We use textual analysis to assess the 
disclosure of the mandated sustainability topics in firms’ annual reports. Specifically, we 
examine two types of disclosure, namely, the disclosure of the mandated key performance 
indicators and the narrative disclosure. Our results reveal a significant increase for both types 
of disclosure relative to the control group. Overall, this treatment effect tends to be smaller for 
firms with higher reporting incentives, i.e., reporting incentives mitigate the regulatory effect. 
Taken together, our results suggest that both standards and reporting incentives shape firms’ 
sustainability disclosure level. 
Keywords: mandatory sustainability disclosure; regulation; reporting incentives; textual 
analysis  




Since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, an increasing number of countries have introduced or 
are in the process of introducing mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations (KPMG et al. 
2016). The most prominent example is European Union (EU) Directive 2014/95/EU, which 
recently mandated the disclosure of nonfinancial and diversity information for certain large 
companies.
1
 Such mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations typically aim to achieve 
enhancements in “the consistency and comparability of non-financial information” (No. 6 
2014/95/EU) and to trigger shifts toward a more sustainable economy (No. 3 2014/95/EU).  
 
However, the empirical evidence is mixed regarding the results achieved by these regulatory 
interventions in the context of sustainability disclosure. While Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) 
document an increase in the level of firms’ corporate sustainability disclosure following the 
introduction of mandatory regulations in four countries, the results from other studies reveal 
generally low compliance with the regulations and thus no significant improvements in firms’ 
sustainability disclosure (Chauvey et al. 2015; Fallan and Fallan 2009; Larrinaga et al. 2002). 
Findings of noncompliance with reporting standards are also obtained for financial disclosure 
(Glaum et al. 2013; Glaum and Street 2003). In this context, researchers often examine the 
mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the 
consequences for accounting quality. Based on a review of empirical studies, Brüggemann et 
al. (2013) conclude that the literature does not provide evidence for an increase in the 
comparability and transparency of financial disclosures after the switchover to IFRS. More 
recently, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) reached the same conclusion. This finding is consistent 
with an “incentives-based” view of reporting regulation (Ball et al. 2003). Since disclosure 
regulations generally provide managers with reporting discretion, researchers argue that both 
reporting standards and reporting incentives determine reporting practices across firms and 
countries. These reporting incentives are shaped by institutional and firm-level factors (Leuz 
and Wysocki 2016).  
 
                                                          
1
 The addressees of the directive are specified as follows: “[…] the obligation to disclose a non-financial 
statement should apply only to those large undertakings which are public-interest entities and to those public-
interest entities which are parent undertakings of a large group, in each case having an average number of 
employees in excess of 500, in the case of a group on a consolidated basis.” (EU Directive, recital 14.) In 
addition, the guidelines on non-financial information provide further guidance. “While the disclosure 
requirements concerning non-financial information apply to large-public interest entities which more than 500 
employees, the disclosure requirements concerning board diversity apply only to large listed companies.” 
(Guidelines on non-financial reporting, footnote 1.) 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277478 
3 
 
While there is a growing literature on the role of the institutional environment in the context 
of financial disclosure (Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Daske 
et al. 2008, 2013; Leuz et al. 2003), there is only limited empirical evidence on the role of 
firm-level factors in a mandatory setting. For instance, Christensen et al. (2015) show that 
accounting quality improvements after IFRS adoption are confined to voluntary adopters. 
Digging deeper into the specific firm-level factors, empirical evidence suggests that capital 
market visibility, growth orientation and the strength of corporate governance impact 
accounting quality improvements (Bassemir and Novotny‐Farkas 2018; Glaum et al. 2013; 
Glaum and Street 2003; Verriest et al. 2013). In addition, Daske et al. (2013) show that 
decreases in the cost of capital and increases in liquidity after IFRS adoption are limited to 
“serious” IFRS adopters.  
 
Against the background of the inconsistent empirical evidence in the context of financial 
disclosure regulations in general and sustainability disclosure regulations in particular, we 
address the lack of consensus in the literature and outline the debate by investigating the 
consequences of the introduction of the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ 
Report) Regulations 2013 (the “SR Regulations”) in the United Kingdom (UK) on firms’ 
disclosure of sustainability information in their annual reports. The SR Regulations mandate 
the disclosure of sustainability-related information in annual reports for listed companies in 
the UK and became effective for financial years ending on or after 30 September 2013. 
Specifically, they mandate disclosure on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, gender breakdown 
and human rights issues. We are interested in two research questions. First, we investigate 
whether the introduction of the SR Regulations is associated with an increase in sustainability 
disclosure in the annual reports among treated firms relative to a control group (i.e., the 
treatment effect). Second, we consider whether firm-level factors are associated with changes 
in sustainability disclosure after the SR Regulations took effect (i.e., the compliance effect). 
Based on prior research, we focus on capital market visibility, growth orientation, governance 
structure, firms’ prior level of voluntary sustainability disclosure and negative media coverage 
(Bassemir and Novotny‐Farkas 2018; Brown and Deegan 1998; Cormier et al. 2005; Daske et 
al. 2013; Fallan and Fallan 2009; Ioannou and Serafeim 2017; Neu et al. 1998; Verriest et al. 
2013). Although we know from the literature that firms with greater reporting incentives are 
more likely to provide higher disclosure levels in a voluntary setting (i.e., the selection effect), 
it is unclear how the selection effect and the treatment effect interact. The effects might be 
complementary, thereby indicating that firms with greater reporting incentives are more likely 
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to comply with the regulation. However, the effects might also be substitutes. In this case, the 
selection effect mitigates the treatment effect since firms have higher voluntary disclosure 
levels to start with. 
 
To assess firms’ sustainability disclosure, we use computer-assisted textual analysis. Textual 
analysis generally denotes the “notion of parsing text for patterns” (Loughran and McDonald 
2016, p. 1187). Because of a steady rise in both computing power and the availability of 
electronic firm disclosures over the last decades, textual analysis is increasingly applied in 
finance and accounting research (Loughran and McDonald 2016). By using textual analysis, 
our measurement of sustainability disclosure is objective, reliable and replicable. We assess 
two types of disclosure, namely, disclosure of the mandated key performance indicators and 
narrative disclosure on the mandated topics. To capture whether firms disclose the mandated 
key performance indicators, we define search queries that require the disclosure of specific 
words in combination with numerical content within a window of five words. For our 
narrative topic-specific disclosure measures, we rely on a methodology that closely follows 
Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) and Hummel et al. (2017). For each topic, we assess the 
similarity of the annual report with text corpora that captures the mandated subjects.  
 
The sample consists of firms listed in the FTSE-350 index and a control group of US firms, 
which are matched by firm size, compliance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
reporting guidelines and industry group. We use a difference-in-difference-in-difference 
approach to compare the treatment effect between firms with low and firms with high 
reporting incentives. The results reveal a significant increase in the disclosure of both key 
performance indicators and narrative disclosures on the mandated topics among treated firms 
relative to the control group after the Companies Act 2006 Regulations 2013 became 
effective. Before the regulation in 2012, our search query reveals that approximately 76 
percent (30 percent) of the FTSE-350 firms provided quantitative information on GHG 
emissions (gender distribution), whereas after the regulation, this proportion increased to 90 
percent (73 percent) in 2013. We find this increase for firms with both low and high reporting 
incentives. With respect to firm-level reporting incentives, we find evidence that firms with 
high reporting incentives provide more disclosure on the mandated topics in a voluntary 
setting (i.e., during the pre-regulatory period or in the control group). Thus, firms with greater 
reporting incentives are more likely to self-select into higher voluntary disclosure levels, 
which is consistent with prior literature. In addition, our results reveal that the selection effect 
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partially mitigates the treatment effect. As a consequence, the treatment effect tends to be 
lower for firms with high reporting incentives. We find this negative triple-difference 
estimator for capital market visibility (measured by the number of analysts following), 
governance mechanisms, and prior sustainability disclosure level, but only for some of our 
disclosure measures. With respect to firms’ growth orientation, we find a complementary 
effect, i.e., growth-oriented firms provide a significantly larger increase in disclosure after the 
regulatory intervention. We do not find evidence that negative media coverage affects the 
disclosure on the mandated topics. 
 
We conduct additional tests to further investigate our findings. Specifically, our results hold 
for different model specifications, including additional control variables and firm fixed 
effects. However, when we shift the event date prior to 2013, the results remain positive and 
significant, thereby indicating that there might be anticipatory effects; i.e., firms might have 
adapted their disclosures even before 2013. We also apply different specifications for the 
measurement of our disclosure variables, and these specifications do not alter our findings. In 
addition, for the narrative disclosure, we use measures based on word counts according to a 
sustainability dictionary developed by Pencle and Mălăescu (2016). The results reveal 
significant increases in disclosure only for the employee and human rights dimension but not 
for the other sustainability dimensions covered by the dictionary (environmental and social), 
thereby indicating that the regulation does not result in substantial spillover effects for 
disclosure on other sustainability topics. Finally, we also examine changes in traditional 
textual attributes, namely, tone, readability, numerical content and report length. While we 
find no change in tone, the reports are significantly longer and more readable and contain 
more numerical content after the adoption of the SR Regulations.  
 
This study aims to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, our study responds to the 
call of Johansen (2016, p. 4) for more “social and environmental accounting research that 
focuses on how, why and to what extent regulation, mandatory or by guidelines, as well as 
voluntary disclosure may influence reporting practices.” In a similar vein, Hombach and 
Sellhorn (2018, p. 27) call for more “empirical evidence on targeted transparency via 
corporate disclosure regulation.” Prior large-sample research often focuses on the overall 
sustainability disclosure level (Ioannou and Serafeim 2017), thereby intermingling voluntary 
and mandatory disclosure items. The use of textual analysis allows us to tailor our analysis to 
the mandated disclosure items and distinguish between disclosure of key performance 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277478 
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indicators and narrative disclosure. Our results reveal an increase in both types of 
sustainability disclosure on the mandated topics. Thus, the regulation appears to be effective 
in stipulating both the disclosure of the mandated key performance indicators and narrative 
disclosure on the mandated topics, although reporting discretion varies for these two types of 
disclosure. This finding indicates that even a modest
2
 disclosure regulation can stimulate an 
increase in sustainability information in firms’ annual reports. Second, our study provides 
additional insights into the role of firm-level factors in the context of mandatory disclosure 
regulations. While numerous studies investigate the role of the institutional environment in 
the context of financial disclosure, empirical evidence on firm-level factors is still scarce. Our 
results show that reporting incentives interact with regulatory effects. Specifically, we find 
some evidence for a negative interaction between the two effects, thereby indicating that the 
regulatory effect is smaller for firms with greater reporting incentives, particularly firms with 
higher capital market visibility, stronger corporate governance mechanisms and higher prior 
voluntary sustainability disclosure level. However, this negative interaction does not lead to a 
complete “crowding-out” of the regulatory effect, as the overall treatment effect remains 
positive and significant even for firms with high reporting incentives. In addition, for firms 
with high growth orientation we find a positive interaction, i.e., these firms are more likely to 
comply with the regulation. Taken together, our study provides further evidence on the role of 
the “incentives-based” view on disclosure regulation. Third, by examining traditional textual 
characteristics, we link our findings to the growing literature that uses textual analysis to 
study financial and nonfinancial disclosure. Our results indicate that the regulatory 
intervention results in longer and more readable annual reports that contain more numerical 
content.  
 
In addition to its contributions to the academic literature, our study has practical implications, 
particularly for firms and regulatory bodies. For firms, the results show that high levels of 
voluntary sustainability disclosure enable better compliance with mandatory sustainability 
disclosure regulations. Against the background of recent developments in both Europe and the 
US
3
, we therefore encourage firms to build up their corresponding management and reporting 
systems. With respect to regulators, the findings reveal that the regulation is effective in 
                                                          
2
 Compared to other sustainability disclosure regulations (e.g., the Grenelle I and Grenelle II in France, which 
mandate the disclosure of 42 sustainability-related performance indicators in firms’ annual reports), we consider 
the disclosure requirements of the SR Regulations as “modest”. 
3
 In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is currently discussing a concept that would require 
the disclosure of public policy and sustainability matters. 
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stipulating higher sustainability disclosure on the mandated topics. The results from our 
robustness tests reveal only limited spillover effects to other sustainability dimensions.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical 
background of the paper. More specifically, we provide information on the regulation and 
develop our research questions against the background of theory and prior financial and 
sustainability disclosure literature. In section three, the research design is explained. Section 
four provides the descriptive statistics and the main findings from our regression analyses. 
Section five presents numerous robustness checks and additional analyses. The final section 
concludes the paper.  
2 Institutional Background, Prior Literature and Research Questions 
2.1 The Companies Act 2006 Regulations 2013 
The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013 (the “SR 
Regulations”) came into force on October 1, 2013, and apply to financial years ending on or 
after September 30, 2013. The SR Regulations extend the scope of sustainability reporting, 
mainly through the duty to prepare a management commentary, referred to as the strategic 
report, which replaces the former business review and the operating and financial review. The 




More specifically, the report must contain a gender breakdown of the company’s employees 
by employee category (Article 414) and must state the “annual quantity of emissions in tons 
of carbon dioxide equivalent from activities for which that company is responsible” (Article 
465). If the required information is not provided, the report must explicitly state this; with 
respect to GHG emissions, the report must explain why the information is not provided.  
 
In addition, the strategic report must include – in the case of a listed company – “to the extent 
necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the company’s 
business, […] information about  
                                                          
4
 Small companies are exempt from creating a strategic report, and medium-sized companies do not need to 
comply with reporting on sustainability indicators, unless they are listed. According to Article 465 of the 
Companies Act, a company qualifies as medium-sized if two of the following criteria are met in two consecutive 
years: (1) Turnover not more than £ 25.9 million, (2) a balance sheet not more than £ 12.9 million, and (3) not 
more than 250 employees.  
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(i) environmental matters (including the impact of the company’s business on the 
environment), 
(ii) the company’s employees, and 
(iii) social, community and human rights issues,  
including information about any policies of the company in relation to those matters and 
the effectiveness of those policies.” (Article 414)  
 
The strategic report must be approved by the board of directors and signed on its behalf 
(Article 414D). Noncompliance results in a monetary sanction for the persons responsible. 
 
It is important to note that prior regulation also requires the disclosure of sustainability 
information in accordance with the EU Modernization directive (Directive 2003/51/EC). 
According to the Companies Act 1985 Regulations 2005, the annual report must include “to 
the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the 
business of the company […], where appropriate, […] information relating to environmental 
matters and employee matters.” Therefore, the changes between the prior regulation and the 
SR Regulations particularly relate to the additional disclosure on GHG emissions and the 
gender breakdown and the additional disclosure of general information on human rights 
issues. For further guidance on the SR Regulations, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
has published “Guidance on the Strategic Report,” and the Department for Environment Food 
& Rural Affairs (DEFRA) has provided “Environmental Reporting Guidelines”. The latter 
document provides detailed guidance on the reporting of environmental information.  
2.2 Theory, Literature and Research Questions 
2.2.1 The Role of Mandatory Disclosure Regulation 
 
In a voluntary setting, traditional accounting theory suggests an equilibrium disclosure level 
in which the marginal costs of disclosure equal its marginal benefits (Verrecchia 2001). 
Mandatory reporting requirements typically represent an external shock to this equilibrium 
with subsequent consequences on firms’ disclosure. However, empirical evidence on the 
disclosure effects of mandatory regulation is mixed. In the context of financial disclosure, this 
mixed empirical evidence is documented in studies on compliance with specific accounting 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277478 
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rules (Glaum et al. 2013) and studies on accounting quality changes after IFRS adoption
5
  (for 
an overview, see Brüggemann et al. 2013; Leuz and Wysocki 2016).
6
 Similarly inconsistent 
findings are obtained in the context of sustainability disclosure regulations. Studies that tend 
to document an increase in sustainability disclosure in response to the introduction of 
mandatory disclosure regulations include Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) and Albertini (2014). 
Studies that find no significant association between mandatory sustainability disclosure 
regulations and sustainability disclosure include Larrinaga et al. (2002), Fallan and Fallan 
(2009), Bebbington et al. (2012), Peters and Romi (2013) and Chauvey et al. (2015).  
 
Potential reasons for noncompliance include unintentional neglect, misinterpretation of 
disclosure rules, and intentional noncompliance – the last originating from cost-benefit 
considerations (Glaum and Street 2003). In a mandatory setting, benefits typically arise from 
the avoidance of sanctions in the case of noncompliance, which are less likely in the case of a 
vaguely phrased reporting regulation.
7
 Specifically, the existence of a “comply-or-explain” 
clause, which is often present in sustainability disclosure regulations, transforms the 
disclosure decision from mandatory to voluntary setting. 
 
As a consequence, the mixed empirical evidence on the effectiveness of sustainability 
disclosure regulations needs to be assessed against the background of the specific disclosure 
regulations under study. For instance, the French sustainability disclosure regulations are 
“orientation laws” with no sanctions for noncompliance (Chauvey et al. 2015; Delbard 2008). 
In the Norwegian context, the phrasing of the regulation was originally very vague but 
became more specific over time (Fallan and Fallan 2009). Only the Spanish regulation under 
study is relatively specific and – as the environmental information must be incorporated into 
the notes to the financial statements – even subject to financial audit. However, because of a 
general lack of normativity, legitimacy and enforcement, compliance with the law was low 
(Bebbington et al. 2012). Similarly, Peters and Romi (2013) speculate about a lack of 
enforcement as potential reasons for low compliance in the US context. Taken together, the 
                                                          
5
 The switchover to IFRS is probably the largest change in an entire set of accounting standards to date and thus 
serves as a research setting for a vast number of studies on the consequences of financial disclosure regulation.  
6
 In addition, other streams of research focus on restatements of accounting errors (Cao et al. 2012; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1991; Palmrose and Scholz 2004) and earnings management in general (for a review, see Healy and 
Wahlen 1999). We do not explicitly account for this literature, as these studies typically focus on 
influencing/misleading stakeholders through financial disclosures. 
7
 If a reporting regulation is only vaguely phrased, it is more difficult to determine non-compliance. 
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phrasing of legislation and potential sanctions in the case of noncompliance and enforcement 
appear to be crucial for the effectiveness of disclosure regulation.  
 
In the context of the SR Regulations, the phrasing of the regulation is precise with respect to 
the disclosure of GHG emissions and gender distribution. It does not specifically require 
narrative disclosure of key performance indicators. Because of the inclusion of the clause “to 
the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the 
company’s business”, reporting discretion is greater for the narrative disclosure on human 
rights issues than for the disclosure of key performance indicators. In addition, the regulation 
refers to monetary sanctions for the persons responsible in the case of noncompliance. We 
expect that these properties of the SR Regulations will support firms’ compliance with the 
regulation. We refer to this effect as the “treatment effect” of the regulation and propose the 
following research question: 
 
RQ1: Do U.K. firms, on average, increase their disclosure of information on GHG emissions, 
gender breakdown, and human rights issues in their annual reports relative to a matched 
control group of US firms after the introduction of the SR Regulations? 
 
2.2.2 The Role of Firm-Level Reporting Incentives 
Despite the characteristics of the regulation itself, an additional explanation for the 
inconsistent findings on the disclosure effects of mandatory regulations is provided by the 
“incentives-based” view of reporting regulation. Mandatory reporting requirements often 
leave managers with reporting discretion for two reasons (Leuz and Wysocki 2016). First, 
reporting standards cannot account for all eventualities that may arise when applying the 
standards in the future. Second, by granting discretion, reporting standards force managers to 
use their private information in applying the standards; the resulting disclosure thus allows for 
partly inferring this private information. Researchers therefore argue that reporting practices 
are determined not only by reporting standards but also by firms’ reporting incentives (Ball et 
al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003). These reporting incentives are shaped by both institutional (Ball et 
al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Daske et al. 
2008, 2013; Leuz et al. 2003) and firm-level factors (Bassemir and Novotny‐Farkas 2018; 
Christensen et al. 2015; Glaum and Street 2003; Verriest et al. 2013). Firm-level reporting 
incentives may affect firms’ disclosure in both a voluntary and a mandatory setting. In a 
voluntary setting, firms with greater reporting incentives are more likely to provide higher 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277478 
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levels of voluntary disclosure (“selection effect”). Whether this relationship also prevails in a 
mandatory setting is unclear. Specifically, firms’ reporting incentives may be related to the 
relative increase in the disclosure level in response to the regulatory intervention (we refer to 
this effect as the “compliance effect”). Our second research question therefore asks for the 
incremental effect of firm-level reporting incentives in the context of the introduction of the 
SR Regulations. We formally posit the following research question: 
 
RQ2: Do firm-level reporting incentives, on average, interact with the increase in disclosure 
of information on GHG emissions, gender breakdown, and human rights issues in the annual 
reports of U.K. firms after the introduction of the SR Regulations relative to a matched 
control group of US firms? 
 
Following the prior literature, we focus on capital market visibility proxied by analyst 
coverage (Bassemir and Novotny‐Farkas 2018; Lang et al. 2004), growth orientation 
(Bassemir 2018; Verriest et al. 2013), corporate governance mechanisms (Eng and Mak 2003; 
Ernstberger and Grüning 2013; Verriest et al. 2013), prior voluntary sustainability disclosure 
(Fallan and Fallan 2009) and critical media coverage (Brammer and Pavelin 2004; Brown and 
Deegan 1998; Neu et al. 1998). The literature shows that these proxies reflect stronger 
reporting incentives in a voluntary setting because of stronger internal and external 
monitoring (capital market visibility and corporate governance mechanisms), higher external 
financing needs (growth orientation), higher implementation levels of sustainability-related 
management and reporting systems and thus lower marginal costs of disclosure (prior 
voluntary sustainability disclosure), and larger legitimacy gaps
8
 (critical media coverage). 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection and Description 
With regard to our research questions, we use a difference-in-difference analysis to examine 
the change in disclosure among UK firms after the regulation became effective relative to a 
control group of US firms. We focus on US firms as our control group because there are no 
mandatory sustainability disclosure regulations in the US that may confound our results. 
                                                          
8
 Legitimacy refers to the perception that a firm’s actions are in accordance with a “socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995). Corporate sustainability disclosure can serve as a 
means to close legitimacy gaps (Sethi 1978). 
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Moreover, by restricting our analysis to English-speaking countries, we avoid bias attributable 
to translation issues.  
 
Panel A of Table 1 provides an overview of the sample selection. Our sample period starts in 
2010, three years prior to the implementation of the SR Regulations, and runs through 2015, 
the last year with sufficient data available in the databases. We start with all firms included in 
the FTSE-350 index as of January 2017 and construct a control group of US firms drawn from 
the S&P-500 and the S&P-1000 index. More precisely, we match the US firms to the UK 
firms based on industry group, firm size (five categories based on the percentile rank of total 
assets) and compliance with the GRI reporting guidelines (compliance versus noncompliance) 




We start with 2,100 firm-year observations for our treated group of FTSE-350 firms and 
manually retrieve the corresponding annual reports as PDF files. The sample of treated firms 
is reduced by 284 observations for which we cannot retrieve the corresponding annual report, 
342 observations for which the annual reports cannot be processed in the textual analysis, and 
232 observations with missing control variables.
10
 Thus, our sample of treated firms 
comprises 1,242 observations. The matching procedure results in 1,175 firm-year 
observations for the matched sample of US firms. For the US firms, we retrieve 10-K 
documents from the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR). 
The combined sample of treated firms and matched control firms thus totals 2,417 firm-year 
observations. It is important to note that the sample is not completely balanced. Specifically, 
we do not exclude U.K. observations for which the annual report in 2012 is missing and thus, 




The results from a t-test of mean differences reveal no significant differences in firm size (t=-
0.4827) and GRI compliance (t=-0.1802) between treated and matched firms for the reporting 
year 2012, thereby indicating that the matching procedure works reasonably well.  
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
                                                          
9
 Matching on the level of sustainability disclosure (e.g., proxied by the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score) is not 
feasible since on average, the US firms have remarkably lower disclosure levels. 
10
 Files that cannot be processed in the textual analysis refer to PDF files with copy protection. 
11
 In addition, we manually adjust the reporting year if a firm’s fiscal year ends before July. We do not adjust the 
reporting year if the fiscal year ends in August or September, which might slightly bias our findings. 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Panel B of Table 1 provides an overview of the sample by year. As shown, our sample is not 
balanced, as we allow for an increase among treated observations after 2012 (because of the 
availability of the reports). Panel C of Table 1 provides an overview by industry group (one-
digit SIC code). Except for the industry group “mining and construction”, there are no 
substantial differences in the sample distribution by industry.  
3.2 Empirical Model and Variables 
To examine the treatment effect of the regulation (RQ1) and the compliance effect of 
reporting incentives (RQ2), we estimate equation (1) for the sample of treated and matched 
firms: 
 
(1)disclosure = β0 + β1treated + β2post x treated + β3inc + β4post x incentive + β5treated x incentive 
+ β6post x treated x incentive + �βicontrolsi + �βjfixed_effectsj + ε 
 
All of the variables are summarized in Table 2. The disclosure variables are described in 
greater detail in section 3.3, and the variables that proxy for reporting incentives are described 
in section 3.4. The main variables of interest and the control variables are described below. 
fixed_effectsi denotes year-fixed effects.
12
 In the robustness section of the paper, for some 
analyses we employ a more parsimonious model that excludes the moderating effects (i.e., 
without β4, β5 and β6) so that the reader can more easily process the main findings. Our 
research setting differs substantially from prior research on sustainability disclosure 
regulation, which often does not include a matched control group or a simultaneous 
investigation of the effect of reporting incentives and the treatment effect (Albertini 2014; 
Chauvey et al. 2015; Fallan and Fallan 2009; Peters and Romi 2013). 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
                                                          
12
 Thus, the main effect of post is not included in the regression since it is captured by the year-fixed effects. 




post is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 beginning with the year the SR Regulations 
became effective, i.e., the year 2013. treated is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
firms on the FTSE-350 index, i.e., firms domiciled in the UK. incentive proxies for firm-level 
reporting incentives (see section 3.4). With respect to research question RQ1, i.e., the 
treatment effect, we are particularly interested in β2 (postxtreated) and the sum of β2 
(postxtreated) and β6 (postxtreatedxincentive). β2 (β2+β6) indicates the change in the 
sustainability reporting behavior of treated firms relative to control firms after the SR 
Regulations became effective for firms with low (high) reporting incentives. With respect to 
the incentive effect, β3, (β3+β4) and (β3+β5) capture the effects of firm-level reporting 
incentives in a voluntary setting, while (β3+β4+β5+β6) capture the effects of reporting 
incentives in a mandatory setting. Moreover, β6 captures the incremental effect of reporting 
incentives on the treatment effect. A positive (negative) coefficient thus indicates whether 
there is a complementary (substitutive) relationship. 
 
We control for numerous firm-level variables, namely, GRI compliance (gri), report length 
(report_length), firm size (size), financial performance (roa), and leverage (lev). GRI 
compliance (gri) proxies for the firm’s adherence to the GRI sustainability reporting 
guidelines. We focus on the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines because they are the most 
common voluntary sustainability disclosure guidelines (Hahn and Kühnen 2013).
13
 We obtain 
data on the application of the GRI reporting guidelines from the Bloomberg database. Firms 
that follow the GRI guidelines might provide more disclosure on the mandated topics because 
of existing voluntary sustainability reporting. In addition, we control for the length of the 
annual report, as more comprehensive reports are more likely to cover the predefined topics. 
We measure report_length as the logarithm of the total word count of each report. Firm size 
(size) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets for each reporting year. In 
accordance with previous studies, we expect to observe a positive relationship between size 
and sustainability disclosure attributable to economies of scale with respect to information 
production costs and the higher public visibility of large companies (Clarkson et al. 2008; 
Clarkson et al. 2011; Patten 2002). Financial performance (roa) is measured as the return on 
total assets for each reporting year. Prior research on the relationship between roa and 
                                                          
13
 The GRI was founded in Boston in 1997 as a non-governmental organization aiming to develop a 
sustainability reporting standard. In 2000, the GRI launched the first version of its sustainability reporting 
guidelines (G1). In 2016, the latest version of the guidelines – the GRI standards – was released. 
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voluntary sustainability disclosure is ambiguous (for a positive relationship, see Cormier et al. 
2005; for a negative relationship, see Neu et al. 1998; for an indifferent relationship see Patten 
1991), and we therefore expect no sign for this relationship. We also account for the financial 
leverage of a company (lev), which is measured as a firm’s total debt divided by its total 
assets for each reporting year. Financial leverage serves as a proxy for creditors’ influence. To 
limit the influence of outliers, we winsorize size, roa, and lev at the top and bottom 1%.  
3.3 Measurement of Disclosure 
The financial disclosure literature usually refers to overall measures of accounting quality, 
such as earnings management and timely loss recognition, as direct measures of disclosure 
quality (Bassemir and Novotny‐Farkas 2018; Christensen et al. 2015) or capital market 
measures, such as market liquidity and cost-of-capital, as indirect measures of disclosure 
quality (Daske et al. 2008). Less prevalent is the use of self-constructed indices and hand-
collected data (Botosan 1997; Glaum et al. 2013; Hail 2002; Verriest et al. 2013), which is by 
far more common in the sustainability disclosure literature.
14
 While the use of self-
constructed indices and hand-collected data comes at the expense of small sample sizes, it is 
particularly useful when measuring specific aspects of disclosure quality, such as compliance 
with specific reporting rules (Glaum et al. 2013; Krause et al. 2017; Verriest et al. 2013), the 
amount of voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Botosan 1997; Hail 2002) and the quantity 
and quality of sustainability disclosure (e.g., Cho et al. 2012; Cho and Patten 2007; Clarkson 
et al. 2008). 
 
To overcome the limitations of small sample sizes and nevertheless utilize a disclosure 
measure that is tailored towards specific disclosure content, we use computer-assisted textual 
analysis to measure the disclosure on the mandated topics, namely, GHG emissions, gender 
distribution and human rights issues, in firms’ annual reports. Specifically, we use Python and 
the nltk and gensim packages. Prior to the textual analysis, we apply various standard 
preprocessing procedures to enhance the comparability of the text corpora.
15
 
                                                          
14
 The higher prevalence of self-constructed indices and hand-collected data in the sustainability disclosure 
literature most likely results from a lack of sufficient databases for the measurement of sustainability disclosure. 
15
 These pre-processing procedures include the elimination of line breaks, tabulators, unicode-wide characters 
and blanks that occur several times in sequence. We then split the text into single words (tokens) and eliminate 
all single characters and stop words. Stop words are words that appear frequently throughout a text but convey 
only minimal meaning (for instance, “a”, “the”, and “of”). For the identification of stop words, we rely on a list 
provided by McDonald (2017). In addition, we eliminate the names of the sample firms. Finally, we lemmatize 
the tokens using the “wordnet” lemmatizer. 




We measure two types of disclosure. First, we assess whether the report provides information 
on the mandated key performance indicators, namely, the amount of GHG emissions and 
gender distribution. For that purpose, in an iterative process, we define search queries based 
on the SR Regulations.
16
 Table 3 provides the logical expressions of the search queries. To 
identify reports that contain the mandated information on GHG emissions, one of the 
following words, “tonne” or “ton”, or a numeric expression must appear together with one of 
the following words, “GHG”, “*co2*”, “carbon”, or the bigram, “greenhouse gas”, within a 
word window of five words (including the key words).
17
 Note that * denotes a wildcard. A 
numeric expression is defined as Arabic numerals or quantitative words. To identify reports 
that comprise the mandated information on gender distribution, the report must contain the 
words “female” or “gender” or “woman” or “sex” and “board” or “director” or “manager” or 
“executive” or “employee” and a numeric expression. In addition, we allow for the bigrams 
“gender distribution”, “gender split” or “gender breakdown”, which have to appear within the 
word window together with a numeric expression. Our disclosure measures ghg_KPI and 
gender_KPI indicate whether a report loads on the query (equals 1) or not (equals 0) and thus 
whether it contains the mandated information. 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Second, we measure the extent to which the report broadly covers the mandated topic, i.e., the 
narrative topic-specific disclosure. To capture the narrative disclosure for each topic, we 
broaden our search queries (see Table 3). Based on the results from the search queries, we 
construct ten-word windows by retrieving the words that appear directly before and after the 
keywords. With respect to the topic of human rights, we search for the bigram (human, right), 
meaning that the two words have to appear side by side (separated only by stop words). Note 
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 The search queries were defined in an iterative process. In this process, we realized that the occurrence of a 
numeric expression is essential in identifying the mandated key performance indicators. In addition, we realized 
that including the words “sex”, “gender” and “woman” in the search queries improves the identification of 
information that is presented in tables. Similarly, including a wildcard before and after ‘CO2’ captures 
expressions such as ‘CO2e’ (CO2 equivalents) and ‘tCO2’ (tons of CO2). 
17
 Thus, the search terms must appear side by side, separated by not more than three (two words in case of 
greenhouse gas) words (excluding stop words).  
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that we construct the word windows by centering the keywords into the word windows.
18
 We 
focus on a limited number of typical words since large word lists are much more prone to 
error because of the ambiguous meaning of words (Loughran and McDonald 2016). Next, we 
collect all retrieved word windows to construct a topic-specific vocabulary. By constructing 
topic-specific vocabularies, we account for additional words that typically appear in the 
context of the identified search terms. We measure the similarity of each report’s vocabulary 
to the topic-specific vocabulary by calculating the cosine similarity (Hoberg and Maksimovic 
2015; Hummel et al. 2017). The cosine similarity is computed as the inner product of two 
vectors: one vector characterizing the word usage in each report and the other calculating the 
word usage in the vocabulary. For conventional reasons, we multiply the cosine similarity by 
100. In section 5.2, we run our analyses with alternative disclosure measures. 
 
Our procedures for constructing the disclosure measures are described in more detail in 
Appendix I. Examples of incorrect classifications with regard to ghg_KPI and gender_KPI 
and the corresponding firm disclosure are provided in Appendix II. 
 
3.4 Reporting Incentives 
With respect to reporting incentives, we focus on capital market visibility (analysts), growth 
orientation (growth), corporate governance (governance), prior sustainability disclosure level 
(prior_discl), and critical sustainability-related media coverage (media). Similar to prior 
studies (Lang et al. 2004; Roulstone 2003), we measure capital market visibility based on the 
number of analysts following a firm (retrieved from the I/B/E/S database). We use a median 
split by each year to distinguish between high (above median) and low (below median) capital 
market visibility. For the measurement of a firm’s growth orientation, we follow Verriest et 
al. (2013) and use the market-to-book value. Again, we construct a binary variable (growth) 
that equals 1 for values above the median and 0 for values below the median. With respect to 
the strength of the firm’s governance mechanisms, we run a principal component analysis on 
four variables retrieved from the Bloomberg and ASSET4 database, namely, whether the 
board has a policy for maintaining effective board functions, whether the company has a 
corporate governance board, whether the company has an audit committee and the percentage 
of independent directors. Similar to the other variables, we construct a binary variable 
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 Thus, the number of words that appear before and after the search terms is dependent on the number of words 
between the search terms. 
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(governance) that equals 1 for values above the median and 0 otherwise. We measure a firm’s 
prior sustainability disclosure level based on the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score (Ioannou 
and Serafeim 2017). The Bloomberg ESG disclosure score measures a firm’s disclosure in the 
areas of environmental, social and corporate governance based on 100 out of 219 raw data 
points and ranges in the interval between 0 and 100. Our variable prior_discl equals 1 if a 
firm’s sustainability disclosure level is above the yearly sample median and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, we measure negative media coverage based on the number of negative media articles 
on environmental, social and human rights topics published for a given firm-year in UK and 
US newspapers.
19
 We retrieve the number of articles from Factiva. Our variable media equals 
1 for negative media coverage that is above the yearly sample median and 0 otherwise. 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the regression variables for the 
sample of treated and matched firms. The mean values for ghg_specific (gender_specific) 
indicate that on average, 49 percent (28 percent) of the reports contain the mandated 
information on GHG emissions (gender distribution). The results for the narrative disclosure 
measures are much lower and are close to zero, similar to the findings of prior studies that 
utilize this approach (Hoberg and Maksimovic 2015; Hummel et al. 2017).
20
 post indicates 
that 52 percent of our observations relate to the period after the SR Regulations became 
effective; treated indicates that 51 percent of our observations belong to the treatment sample. 
Regarding the variables that proxy for reporting incentives, we report the untransformed 
values.
21
 On average, each firm has 16 analysts with a minimum of no analysts following and 
a maximum of 44 analysts following (original, untransformed values). Market-to-book value 
                                                          
19
 The search query is composed the following logical expression for environmental topics:  ((ECOLOGY or 
EMISSION or WATER or ENVIRONMENTAL or OIL or WASTE or (PALM and OIL) or (NUCLEAR and 
POWER) or ENERGY) and (LEAK or CONTROVERSY or DAMAGE or CRITICISM or RECALL or 
VIOLATION or crisis)) or POLLUTION or (LAND and CONTAMINATION) or (OIL and SPILL) or (WASTE 
and DISCHARGE) or (TOXIC and WASTE) or CONTAMINATION or ASBESTOS.  
The search query is composed of the following logical expression for social and human rights topics:  ((POOR or 
UNSAFE or UNFAIR) and (WORK or WORKING or EMPLOYMENT)) or (CHILD and LABOR) or 
(WORKER and DEATH) OR (SEXUAL and EXPLOITATION) or (LAND and GRAB) or (((TRADE and 
UNION) or WORKER or WORK OR LABOR or (HUMAN and RIGHT)) and (ABUSE or DISCRIMINATION 
or SUPPRESSION or REPRESSION or VIOLENCE OR CRTICISM or CONTROVERSY or DEATH or 
VIOLATION)). 
20
 Note that for reasons of convenience, the values of the cosine similarity are multiplied by 100. 
21
 Note that the variables that proxy for firm-level reporting incentives are transformed based on a median split 
of the sample for each year. 
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equals on average 1.13, thereby indicating that on average, the firms have growth 
opportunities. Because of the standardization of the original items, the mean values of the 
factor scores for governance are close to zero, with a standard deviation of close to one. The 
prior sustainability disclosure level has a mean value of 30.46 with a minimum of 6.2 and a 
maximum of 75.62. Compared to prior research, these values are considerably high (Ioannou 
and Serafeim 2017) and might originate from the relatively high level of voluntary 
sustainability disclosure that has developed over time in the UK (Bebbington et al. 2012; 
KPMG 2011, p. 10, 2013, p. 23, 2015, p. 33). With respect to media, firms have on average 
52 negative sustainability-related newspaper articles per year, with a minimum of zero and a 
maximum of 23,767 articles (original, untransformed values).
22
 With respect to the control 
variables, gri indicates that 24 percent of the observations provide their sustainability 
disclosures according to the GRI guidelines. The original values of report_length 
(untabulated) indicate that the average report comprises 77,589 words. On average, the 
sample firms have 33 million GPD in assets (original values untabulated), a relatively high 




Regarding the textual measures gender_KPI and ghg_KPI, we manually check the validity of 
the findings. Overall, the search query appears to be appropriate in identifying the required 
information. In the Appendix, we provide examples of incorrect classifications. For instance, 
our search query might not correctly identify the reported information when one of the search 
terms appears in the text and one of the search terms appears in a table or both search terms 
appear in a table. In this case, the search terms might not appear within the five-word window. 
In other instances, the search query loads, although including the required information, are not 
reported, such as when year dates are identified as numeric expression without directly 
specifying the amount of GHG emissions or number of female employees.  
 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the mean values and standard deviation for the disclosure variables 
for each reporting year and the sample of treated versus control firms separately. For the 
sample of treated firms, reporting on the mandated key performance indicators is already high 
before 2013, i.e., before the regulation took effect. In 2010, 78 percent of the firms provide 
quantitative information on their GHG emissions; this figure increases to 85 percent in 2013. 
With respect to information on gender distribution, only 16 percent of the firms disclose this 
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 The maximum of 24,241 articles refers to BP in 2010. 
23
 Note that despite winsorization, the maximum value for roa equals 3.58. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277478 
20 
 
information in 2010, compared to 65 percent in 2013. Thus, there is a high level of 
compliance with the regulations, but there are still firms that do not provide the mandated 
information, which is in line with Glaum et al. (2013); Larrinaga et al. (2002); Peters and 
Romi (2013). Remarkably, the peak is in 2014, followed by a slight decrease in 2015. The 
data on the narrative disclosure provide a similar picture. The data reveal a steady increase in 
ghg_narrative, gender_narrative and hr_narrative until 2014 and a drop in the data in 2015. 
For the sample of matched firms, disclosure on the key performance indicators is low and 
does not substantially change over time. On average, approximately 10 percent of the firms 
publish quantitative information on their GHG emissions, and only approximately 0.5 percent 
of the firms publish the gender distribution. With respect to the narrative disclosure measures, 
the mean values are substantially lower for the sample of control firms than for the sample of 
treated firms. Similar to the treatment group, there is a steady increase in the mean values of 
the narrative disclosure measures over time. 
 
Panel C of Table 4 provides an overview of the twenty most frequent words along with their 
frequency in the retrieved ten-word windows, i.e., the topic vocabularies.
24
 These words 
provide some intuition regarding the validity of our disclosure measures. With some 
exceptions, for instance, the words “year” and “report” in the vocabulary for the disclosure 
measure gender_narrative, the words appear to capture the mandated topics appropriately.  
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.2 Bivariate Statistics 
Table 5 presents the correlation statistics for the regression variables. All of the disclosure 
measures are positively and significantly correlated with each other, indicating that narrative 
disclosure accompanies disclosure on the mandated key performance indicators and 
disclosure on GHG emissions accompanies disclosure on gender distribution and human 
rights and vice versa. All of the disclosure measures are positively and significantly correlated 
                                                          
24
 Note that the frequency refers to the occurrence of the words in the topic vocabularies, not in the annual 
reports. Because of the construction of the windows, the same word might appear more than once in the 
vocabulary if the word window is composed of more than one search term. 
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with both post and treated, indicating that disclosure is higher in the period when the SR 
Regulations became effective and among treated firms. Moreover, except for governance, our 
proxies for reporting incentives are positively correlated with all the disclosure measures. In 
addition, except for governance and prior_discl, the proxies for reporting incentives are not 
correlated with treated and none of the proxies is correlated with post.  With respect to the 
control variables, report_length is positively correlated with all disclosure measures thereby 
indicating that longer reports provide more disclosure on the mandated topics. gri is also 
positively related to all disclosure measures except gender_narrative, thereby indicating that 
firms that follow the GRI guidelines are more likely to provide information on GHG 
emissions and gender distribution and provide more narrative information on GHG emissions 
and human rights. Finally, roa is positively related to the disclosure measures, whereas the 
coefficients for size and lev are ambiguous and not significant.  
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 6 presents the results from univariate difference-in-differences analyses. Specifically, 
we compute the difference in our disclosure variables between pre-period and post-period for 
the treated and control firms and compare the difference in these differences. For the sample 
of treated firms, the results reveal a significantly higher disclosure level for all disclosure 
measures in the period after the adoption of the SR Regulations. For control firms, the results 
reveal no significant differences in the disclosure measures between the preadoption and the 
postadoption periods of the SR Regulations with respect to the disclosure of the key 
performance indicators as well as narrative disclosure on GHG emissions. However, firms in 
the control sample provide significantly more narrative information on gender distribution and 
human rights in the period of 2013-2015 than in the period of 2010-2012. In addition, this 
increase is significantly larger for the treated firms compared to the control firms, as indicated 
by the difference-in-differences estimators. 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
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4.3 Regression Analyses 
Table 7 documents the findings of the regression analyses for examining our research 
questions. We present model specifications with year-fixed effects and standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
With respect to our first research question, i.e., the treatment effect, the coefficients of interest 
are β2 (postxtreated) and the sum of β2 (postxtreated) and β6 (postxtreatedxincentive). The 
findings reveal positive and significant coefficients for our difference-in-difference estimator 
β2 across all disclosure measures and reporting incentives, with only one exception 
(hr_narrative and prior_discl). Thus, in case of low reporting incentives, the increase in 
disclosure among treated firms after the implementation of the SR Regulations is significantly 
greater than that among firms in the control group. We obtain similar findings in case of high 
reporting incentives, i.e., the sum (β2 + β6) is positive and significant in almost all 
regressions.
25
 This result is consistent with the findings of Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) but 
not with those of (Bebbington et al. 2012; Chauvey et al. 2015; Fallan and Fallan 2009; 
Larrinaga et al. 2002; Peters and Romi 2013).  
 
It is important to highlight that the change in disclosure pertains to all disclosure topics. 
Although the SR Regulations are relatively modest in mandating sustainability disclosure, the 
results show that even such a modest regulation can induce an increase in disclosure. 
Specifically, the results show an increase not only in the disclosure of the mandated key 
performance indicators for which the phrasing of the regulation and the disclosure itself is 
very precise and specific but also in the narrative disclosure measures. This increase in 
narrative disclosure is not limited to accompanying disclosure on the mandated key 
performance indicators but also includes disclosure on human rights issues. In the robustness 
section of the paper, we therefore examine additional spillover effects and test whether the 
disclosure increase also relates to other dimensions of sustainability. Nevertheless, despite this 
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 Except for ghg_narrative and analysts, hr_narrative and growth, hr_narrative and governance, ghg_KPI and 
prior_discl, and hr_narrative and prior_discl. 
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significant increase in disclosure, there are still firms that do not provide the mandated 
information (see section 4.1). Next, we are therefore interested in whether reporting incentives 
shape firms’ responses to SR Regulations.  
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
With respect to our second research question (RQ2), we first examine the selection effect, i.e., 
the role of reporting incentives in a voluntary setting. Overall, firm-level reporting incentives 
tend to be positively associated with the disclosure measures in a voluntary setting as 
indicated by β3, (β3+β5) and (β4+β4). That means that in a voluntary setting, firms with 
higher reporting incentives provide higher disclosure levels, i.e., the selection effect. With 
respect to the compliance effect, we find some evidence for a negative effect for capital 
market visibility, corporate governance mechanisms and prior voluntary sustainability 
disclosure level.
26
 Thus, the incremental effect of high reporting incentives on the treatment 
effect of the SR Regulations is negative, which suggests that reporting incentives partially 
mitigate the treatment effect. However, it is important to note that the overall treatment effect 
(i.e., β2+β6) remains positive. Below, we discuss our findings for the reporting incentives in 
more detail. 
 
With respect to capital market visibility, the results reveal a positive effect of capital market 
visibility on all disclosure measures in a voluntary setting.
27
 Thus, firms with higher capital 
market visibility have higher reporting incentives to reduce information asymmetries and 
avoid the adverse selection problem. Even in a mandatory setting, the positive relationship 
between capital market visibility and disclosure holds (β3+β4+β5+β6). This finding is 
consistent with Bassemir and Novotny‐Farkas (2018), who report that capital market-oriented 
firms exhibit significantly higher accounting quality in the postadoption period. However, the 
positive selection effect partially mitigates the treatment effect. As a consequence, the 
incremental effect of capital market visibility on the treatment effect (the triple interaction β7) 
is negative for ghg_KPI and ghg_narrative, which means that the increase in disclosure on 
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 For growth, the triple interaction is positive. For media, the triple interaction is not significant. 
27
 (β3+β5) is positive and significant for all disclosure measures and (β3+β4) is positive and significant for some 
disclosure measures. 
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GHG emissions after the SR Regulations is smaller for firms with high capital market 
visibility. 
 
For growth orientation, the results are much weaker than for capital market visibility. There 
are some indications of a positive selection effect with respect to gender_KPI (β3 and β3+β4), 
gender_narrative (β3 and β3+β4) and hr_narrative (β3+β4 and β3+β5), but not for ghg_KPI 
and ghg_narrative. Growth firms have higher external financing needs and thus have more 
incentives to reduce the costs of external financing through increased disclosure. This 
relationship also holds for the mandatory setting with respect to gender_narrative and 
hr_narrative (i.e., (β3+β4+β5+β6) is positive and significant), which is in accordance with the 
results provided by Verriest et al. (2013) and Bassemir (2018). In addition, we obtain a 
positive and significant compliance effect for gender_narrative, thereby suggesting a 
complementary relationship between growth orientation and the regulatory intervention. In 
other words, growth firms increase the narrative disclosure on gender distribution in response 
to the regulatory intervention more than other firms. Note that this is the only reporting 
incentive for which we find a positive compliance effect.  
 
With respect to corporate governance mechanisms, we also find some evidence for a positive 
effect on the disclosure measures in a voluntary setting.
28
 Strong corporate governance 
mechanisms enhance the monitoring of managers, thereby reducing the benefits of 
withholding information, which results in a disclosure increase. The finding is thus in line 
with the literature and also partly holds for a mandatory setting (ghg_KPI and ghg_narrative). 
However, β3 is negative and significant with respect to gender_KPI, thereby indicating that 
on average, US firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms provide less 
information on gender distribution. With respect to the compliance effect, the triple 
interaction is negative and significant for gender_narrative, thereby suggesting a negative 
incremental effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the treatment effect. This negative 
effect is consistent with the findings of Ernstberger and Grüning (2013), who provide 
evidence that the positive association between corporate governance and disclosure is 
particularly prevalent in countries with weak regulatory environments.  
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 More precisely, (β3+β4) is positive and significant for ghg_KPI and gender_KPI and (β3+β5) is positive and 
significant for gender_KPI, ghg_narrative and gender_narrative. 
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For firms’ prior voluntary sustainability disclosure level, the results reveal a positive effect on 
all disclosure measures in both a voluntary and a mandatory setting (β3+β4+β5+β6). These 
findings indicate that firms with higher prior voluntary sustainability disclosure levels are 
more likely to disclose the key performance indicators and to provide narrative information on 
GHG emissions, gender distribution and human rights in their annual reports. In addition, we 
obtain a negative triple interaction for ghg_KPI, thereby indicating that the positive selection 
effect partially mitigates the treatment effect. This finding contrasts with Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2017) who find a treatment effect for firms with both high and low prior voluntary 
sustainability disclosure levels.  
 
Finally, our results suggest that the role of media coverage is only marginal in our setting. 
There is loose evidence suggesting a negative effect of media coverage in a voluntary setting 
among US firms (β3), but positive effects among UK firms in the pre-regulatory period 
(β3+β5). In addition, the triple interaction is not significant for none of the disclosure 
measures. Thus, legitimacy concerns, which sustainability disclosure research has identified 
as important drivers of voluntary disclosure, are not associated with the disclosure of 
sustainability information in annual reports and do not alter changes in disclosure in the event 
of a regulatory intervention. In other words, firms do not use sustainability disclosure in 
annual reports to close potential legitimacy gaps or even to manipulate stakeholders’ 
perceptions. One potential reason might be that the disclosure medium of the annual report 
particularly matches the needs of capital market participants, whereas the broad group of 
other stakeholders is more likely to consider other disclosure channels, such as company 
websites and standalone sustainability reports. Of course, our findings are restricted to the 
disclosure on the mandated topics, and firms might respond to legitimacy gaps by increasing 
their disclosures on other topics. 
5 Robustness and Additional Analyses 
5.1 Alternative Model Specifications 
We conduct numerous additional analyses to further investigate our findings. First, we 
address the concern that our findings could be driven by systematic differences in the sample 
firms. For that reason, we rerun the analyses and include firm-fixed effects. The results 
remain substantially unchanged (untabulated). In particular, the treatment effect (postxtreated) 
remains positive and significant across all model specifications, while the incentive effect 
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(postxtreatedxincentive) is negative and significant for some of the model specifications 
(similar to our baseline results). Next, we investigate whether firms’ sustainability 
performance confounds our findings. In a voluntary setting, the literature documents that 
superior sustainability performers in particular disclose accurate and comparable 
sustainability information to signal their superior performance type to the capital market 
(Clarkson et al. 2008; Clarkson et al. 2011; Hummel and Schlick 2016). Therefore, one may 
argue that superior sustainability performers are more likely to provide specific sustainability 
information. We rerun the regression analyses including the overall sustainability 
performance rating of the ThomsonReuters Asset4 database to proxy for firm sustainability 
performance. Because of missing values on the sustainability performance variable, our 
sample is reduced to 2,175 observations. Overall, the main findings hold. Specifically, β2 
(postxtreated) remains positive and significant for all models, and the results from our 
baseline specification for β5 (postxtreatedxincentive) hold. In addition, the coefficient for 
sustainability performance is positive and significant in almost all models. Thus, sustainability 
performance is positively associated with sustainability disclosure, which tends to support the 
traditional reasoning of voluntary disclosure theory.
29
 Second, we examine the validity of our 
findings by constructing placebo events. For that purpose, we construct a new variable that 
replaces the variable post, thereby shifting backward the year for which the regulation 
becomes effective. More precisely, placebo12xtreated equals “1” beginning in 2012 onwards, 
and “0” otherwise. If our interpretation of the results is valid, we would expect to find 
insignificant estimated coefficients for placebo12xtreated. Note that we focus on the 
treatment effect only. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficients for placebo12xtreated are 
still positive and significant, thereby indicating that there might be anticipatory effects, i.e., 
firms might have adapted their disclosure even before 2013. To dig deeper into this finding, 
we replace postxtreated by separate interaction terms for each year, i.e., 2011xtreated, 
2012xtreated, 2013xtreated, 2014xtreated and 2015xtreated. The results show a steady 
increase in disclosure on information on gender issues (both gender_narrative and 
gender_KPI) in the treatment group relative to the control group for the whole period of 
analysis, with increasing coefficients for yearxtreated. For the other disclosure variables, the 
results show that the increase in disclosure among the treated firms relative to the control 
firms becomes significant, particularly for the years after the regulation became effective, i.e., 
in 2013/2014 (ghg_narrative, hr_narrative) or 2014/2015 (ghg_KPI).  
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 For a thorough debate on the relationship between sustainability performance and sustainability disclosure, see 
Hummel and Schlick (2016). 





Insert Table 8 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
With respect to the reporting incentives, we disaggregate the factor variable governance and 
examine each variable separately. In contrast to the main findings, we now obtain 
insignificant coefficients for the triple interactions. Next, instead of examining the firm’s prior 
level of sustainability disclosure, we examine the firm’s prior level of sustainability 
performance as a moderating variable. The results remain substantially the same compared to 
the baseline specification with prior_discl as moderating variable (note that the sample size is 
reduced to 2,107 observations). Because of the high correlation between these two measures, 
the moderating effects appear to stem from a firm’s overall sustainability orientation, not only 
from a firm’s overall level of sustainability disclosure. With respect to negative media 
coverage, we disaggregate the score into the components “environmental” and “social and 
human rights”. The results remain unchanged. 
5.2 Alternative Disclosure Measures and Textual Attributes 
With respect to our disclosure measures, we investigate several alternative constructions. For 
the measurement of ghg_KPI, we additionally require the exclusion of “no” and “not” from 
the five-word windows.
30
 For that purpose, we have to rerun the preprocessing procedures, as 
these words were originally defined as stop words. The measures remain almost identical and 
thus, our main results do not change. Next, we are interested in whether treated firms increase 
their disclosure not only on the mandated sustainability topics but also on sustainability in 
general. Therefore, we construct disclosure measures based on the sustainability dictionary 
developed by Pencle and Mălăescu (2016). In an iterative process, the authors develop a 
dictionary of words that are typically used to describe the sustainability dimensions of 
environment, employee and human rights. Our disclosure measures count_ENV, 
count_EMPL, and count_HR are calculated based on the number of words in each report that 
correspond with the words listed in the dictionary divided by the total number of words. In 
addition, we include count_SOCIAL, which is calculated based on the word counts for the 
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 By allowing for the occurrence of “no” and “not” in the five-word windows, one may argue that we might 
capture statements such as “The company emits 0 tons of CO2”.  
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social dimension. It is important to note that the dictionary attempts to capture the complete 
environmental, employee, and human rights dimension, whereas our topic-specific narrative 
disclosure measures focus on the mandated topics, which comprise only specific aspects of 
these sustainability dimensions. In addition, the use of word counts and dictionary-based 
measures comes at a certain expense. Specifically, the dictionary itself needs to be valid. Such 
dictionaries typically are composed of a considerable number of words with ambiguous 
meanings, which may confound the validity of the measurement.
31
 Although the dictionary is 
validated by experts, the inclusion of some of the words is questionable.
32
 Moreover, the 
dictionary was developed based on 10-K statements of US firms and thus, the resulting words 
might be biased toward US language.
33






Insert Table 9 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Panel A of Table 9 provides Pearson correlation coefficients for the sample of treated firms. 
The results reveal significantly positive correlations between the window-based narrative 
disclosure measures on the mandated topics and the word count-based disclosure measures. 
The correlations range in the interval between 0.30 (for hr_narrative and count_HR) and 0.42 
(ghg_narrative and count_ENV), thereby indicating some but not complete overlap between 
the topic-specific measures and the word count-based measures for the corresponding 
sustainability dimension. Next, we run OLS regression analyses for equation (1) and for a 
model without the moderating variables. For convenience reasons, Panel B of Table 9 
displays the results from the latter model for the word count-based measures. The results 
indicate a significant increase in disclosure among treated firms for the employee and human 
rights dimension but not for the environmental and social dimension, thereby indicating that 
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 For instance, the dictionary provided by Pencle and Mălăescu (2016) includes 319 words for the employee 
dimension, 451 words for the environmental dimension, and 297 words for the human rights dimension. 
32
 Examples include the words “balancing”, “certification”, “agent”, “award”, “died”, “election”, “law”, 
“outsourcing”, “personal”, “person” or “worker” in the human rights dimension and the words “country”, 
“innovation”, “reasonable”, “science”, “suitable”, and “voluntary” in the environmental dimension. 
33
 Typical US words are, for instance, “EPA” and “environmental protection agency” in the environmental 
dimension, “African American” in the employee and human rights dimension, and “first nation” in the human 
rights dimension. 
34
 Specifically, the use of word counts implies that each word receives the same weight, although adjustments 
based on how unusual the word is typically enhance the validity of the measure (Loughran and McDonald 2016). 
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potential spillover effects from the regulation towards disclosure of other sustainability 
dimension are limited. 
 
Finally, we are interested in whether the regulation affects other textual attributes, namely, 
tone, readability, numerical content and report length. Recently, Muslu et al. (2017) 
aggregated these textual attributes into a sustainability disclosure measure and show a positive 
relationship with analyst forecast accuracy. In the context of mandatory sustainability 
disclosure regulation, prior research has often examined the reporting of good versus bad 
news as a potential consequence of mandatory disclosure regulations (Chauvey et al. 2015; 
Costa and Agostini 2016; Larrinaga et al. 2002). In general, mandatory disclosure regulations 
aim to increase disclosure regardless of the actual performance of a company. Compared to a 
voluntary reporting regime, we would thus expect to find either no change or an increase in 
the disclosure of negative information after the regulatory intervention in the treatment group 
versus the control group. However, prior research has documented a decrease in bad news 
reporting after regulatory interventions (Chauvey et al. 2015; Costa and Agostini 2016). tone 
is measured as the number of positive words minus the number of negative words divided by 
the total number of words.
35
 We caution our readers that tone is a crude measure that gauges 
the sentiment of the text and not the content of the information, i.e., whether bad or good 
news is reported. In addition, we examine the readability of the reports, i.e., “whether the 
receiver of information can accurately reconstruct the intended message” (Loughran and 
McDonald 2016). In the context of financial disclosure, empirical evidence suggests a 
positive relationship between the readability of firms’ financial disclosure and market 
efficiency (Biddle et al. 2009; Lo et al. 2017; Loughran and McDonald 2014). In the context 
of sustainability disclosure, empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between 
financial and sustainability performance and readability (Melloni et al. 2017; Nazari et al. 
2017). Better performing firms provide more readable reports to signal their superior 
performance, whereas poorly performing firms provide less readable reports as part of an 
obfuscation strategy. We therefore expect the reports to become more readable because of the 
regulatory intervention. readability is measured based on an aggregation of the Fog Index, 
Flesch-Kincaid and Flesch Reading Ease, multiplied by (-1) (De Franco et al. 2015; Hummel 
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 Positive and negative words are defined according to a word list provided by Loughran and McDonald (2011). 





 Next, we also examine the accuracy of the report based on its numerical 
content. It is often argued that numerical information is more accurate, objective, comparable 
and verifiable (Clarkson et al. 2008; Clarkson et al. 2011). Muslu et al. (2017) show higher 
analyst forecast accuracy for sustainability reports that contain more numerical content. 
However, since the regulation mandates both quantitative and narrative disclosure, the effect 
on the proportion of numerical content in reports is unclear. We measure numerical content 
based on ratio_numbers, which is defined as the proportion of Arabic numerals over the total 
number of words.
37
 Finally, we are also interested in whether the overall length of the annual 
report (report_length) changes because of the adoption of the SR Regulations. While 
Loughran and McDonald (2014) argue that file size can serve as an inverse proxy for 
readability, as managers provide longer and more complex reports for obfuscation reasons, 
other researchers argue that longer reports simply provide more information than shorter 
reports (Li 2008; Muslu et al. 2017). In the context of sustainability disclosure, Nazari et al. 
(2017) show that the length of a firm’s standalone sustainability report is positively associated 
with sustainability performance. Since the SR Regulations require additional disclosure, we 
expect an increase in report length when the regulation became effective. The results are 
displayed in Panel C of Table 9. Again, we report the results for the parsimonious model, i.e., 
without the moderating effects. With respect to tone, the results show that the tone of the UK 
annual reports is more positive than that of the US annual reports, which might be related to 
the stricter format of the 10-K statements. However, there is no significant change in tone in 
response to the regulation. With respect to the other textual characteristics, the results reveal a 
significant decrease in readability among US firms and a significant increase in readability 
among UK firms after the regulation. Similar findings are obtained for the numerical content 
and the length of the reports, which also significantly increase after the regulation among UK 
firms relative to US firms. Taken together, the results suggest that the UK reports become 
longer and more readable and contain more numerical content after the adoption of the SR 
Regulations, while the tone of the reports remains unchanged. 
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 Higher values thus reflect better readability of the text. The measures are calculated based on the average 
number of words per sentence (w), the percentage of complex words relative to all words (p) and the average 
number of syllables per word (s):  
Fog Index = 0.4 *(w+p); Flesch-Kincaid=11.8s+0.39w-15.59; Flesch Reading Ease=206.8-1.015w-84.6s.  
37
 Note that we transform numbers separated by “,” or “.” into a single token. Nevertheless, our measure is noisy 
since we cannot exclude page numbers, chapter numbers and figure numbers. 




This paper investigates the consequences of the introduction of the Companies Act 2006 
Regulations 2013 on firms’ disclosure of sustainability information in their annual reports. 
The regulation mandates the disclosure of key performance indicators, namely, the amount of 
GHG emissions and the distribution of gender across different employee categories, along 
with the disclosure of general information on human rights issues. We are interested in two 
research questions: first, whether UK firms on average increase their disclosure on the 
mandated topics after the regulation took effect relative to a control group of US firms 
(treatment effect); and second, whether this increase in disclosure is moderated by firm-level 
reporting incentives that prior research has identified to be significant in a mandatory setting 
(compliance effect). 
 
To measure disclosure on the mandated topics, we use computer-assisted textual analysis. 
This allows us to conduct precisely defined analyses of firm disclosures for large sample sizes 
and thus to overcome typical limitations in sustainability disclosure research. We focus on 
two types of disclosure, namely, disclosure of key performance indicators and narrative 
information on the mandated topics. To identify whether firms disclose the mandated 
indicators, we define specific search queries. For the measurement of firms’ narrative 
disclosure on the mandated topics, we rely on a methodology that was originally developed by 
Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) and has been adapted by Hummel et al. (2017). 
 
Our sample consists of firms listed in the FTSE-350 index and a matched control group of US 
firms. To investigate our research questions, we use a triple-difference design. Specifically, 
with respect to our first research question, we examine the change in disclosure for the treated 
group relative to the control group for both high and low reporting incentives. With respect to 
our second research question, we are interested in the incremental change in the treatment 
effect attributable to firm-level reporting incentives. Our results reveal a positive and 
significant increase in disclosure among the treated firms relative to a control group after the 
regulation became effective. This finding pertains to all disclosure measures, including key 
performance indicators and narrative disclosure. With respect to our second research question, 
the results reveal that capital market visibility, growth orientation, corporate governance 
mechanisms and a firm’s prior voluntary sustainability disclosure level partly moderate the 
increase in disclosure after the regulation. Specifically, we find a negative triple interaction 
for these reporting incentives except for growth orientation, thereby indicating that stronger 
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reporting incentives mitigate the treatment effect. For growth orientation we find a 
complementary effect. We do not find any evidence that negative media coverage is 
associated with this disclosure increase. In the robustness section of the paper, we provide 
additional insights into how traditional textual attributes are affected by the regulation. The 
results show a significant increase in the readability, numerical content and overall length of 
the annual reports.  
 
As always, the results of our study are subject to limitations. First, we caution our readers not 
to over-interpret our findings, since we performed rather an association study than a causal 
study. Specifically, we do not claim to fully solve the endogeneity problem with our research 
design. Instead, the paper provides large-sample empirical evidence on the disclosure of 
sustainability information in annual reports around the adoption of new regulations. We thus 
provide rich descriptive evidence in line with Gow et al. (2016), who call for more descriptive 
studies in accounting and a deeper investigation of accounting as an “applied discipline”. 
Based on our empirical evidence, future studies might be more concerned with the 
endogeneity problem. Second, the focus on a national regulatory intervention limits the 
generalizability of the findings because of the existence of country-specific regulations and 
institutions. Thus, our results need to be interpreted against the background of the SR 
Regulations. In addition, the dual-country setting does not allow us to account for institutional 
factors, which have been shown to shape reporting incentives in the contexts of both financial 
disclosure (Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Daske et al. 2008, 2013) 
and sustainability disclosure (Cahan et al. 2016; Dhaliwal et al. 2014; Dhaliwal et al. 2012). 
The recent adoption of the EU Directive on nonfinancial disclosure offers a promising 
research setting for future studies to examine the role of institutional factors in the context of 
nonfinancial disclosure. Of particular interest is how interactions between firm- and country-
level factors turn out in a sustainability disclosure setting. Third, the usual limitations of 
textual analysis apply (Loughran and McDonald 2016). Because of the novelty of textual 
analysis in accounting research, the methodologies are still in a developmental stage, and 
empirical evidence on their use is therefore scarce. Our paper introduces and adapts one 
methodology that can be used to measure narrative topic-specific disclosure in annual reports. 
By providing detailed descriptions of the textual analysis, we aim to increase the transparency 
and replicability of our findings. In addition, examples and results from additional analyses 
and robustness checks further support the validity of our findings. Finally, the study does not 
examine the “real” effects of this disclosure regulation, i.e., the consequences for firms’ 
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performance with respect to the mandated sustainability topics, although improvements in 
firms’ sustainability performance are often mentioned as a regulatory objective in this context 
(Directive 2014/95/EU ; Leuz and Wysocki 2016, p. 527). Future research could provide in-
depth evidence on these effects in terms of both firm sustainability performance and capital 
market effects, thereby extending the findings, which are currently primarily limited to 
sustainability disclosure in a voluntary setting.  
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Table 1: Sample selection and composition by industry 
Panel A: Sample selection  
FTSE-350 firms (350 firms, 6 reporting years) 2,100 
Less: observations with missing annual reports -284 
Less: observations for which the reports cannot be processed -342 
Less: observations with missing control variables -232 
Sample of treated firms: 1,242 
  
Matched sample of US firms (198 firms, 6 reporting years) 1,175 
  
Sample of treated and matched firms: 2,417 
    
    
Panel B: Sample distribution by year    
 treated matched Total 
2010 189 190 379 
2011 193 193 386 
2012 201 198 399 
2013 209 198 407 
2014 221 198 419 
2015 229 198 427 
Total sample: 1,242 1,175 2,417 
 
Panel C: Sample distribution by industry    
 treated matched Total 
1 Mining and construction 135 92 227 
2 Manufacturing 338 331 669 
3 Transportation and public utilities 150 132 282 
4 Wholesale and retail trade 170 159 329 
5 Finance, insurance and real estate 288 284 572 
6 Services 161 177 338 
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Dependent variables for sustainability disclosure  
ghg_KPI Binary variable indicating whether the report discloses the key 
performance indicator “quantity of GHG emissions”; the 
corresponding search query is displayed in Table 3. 
Textual analysis 
gender_KPI Binary variable indicating whether the report discloses the key 
performance indicator “gender distribution”; the corresponding search 
query is displayed in Table 3. 
Textual analysis 
ghg_narrative Cosine similarity of the vocabulary of each report with a vocabulary 
that reflects the mandated topic of GHG emissions. The vocabulary is 
constructed based on an aggregation of ten-word windows that are 
retrieved according to a search query displayed in Table 3. 
Textual analysis 
gender_narrative Cosine similarity of the vocabulary of each report with a vocabulary 
that reflects the mandated topic of gender distribution. The 
vocabulary is constructed based on an aggregation of ten-word 
windows that are retrieved according to a search query displayed in 
Table 3. 
Textual analysis 
hr_narrative Cosine similarity of the vocabulary of each report with a vocabulary 
that reflects the mandated topic of human rights. The vocabulary is 
constructed based on an aggregation of ten-word windows that are 
retrieved according to a search query displayed in Table 3. 
Textual analysis 
Main variables of interest   
post Dummy variable that equals “1” beginning in the year the SR 
Regulations became effective (2013) and “0” otherwise. 
Datastream 
Worldscope 
treated Dummy variable that equals “1” if a firm is domiciled in the 
“treatment” country, i.e., the UK, and “0” otherwise. 
Datastream 
Worldscope 
Reporting incentives  
analysts Binary variable that equals 1 if the number of analysts following a 
firm is above the sample median in the respective year and 0 
otherwise. 
I/B/E/S 
growth Binary variable that equals 1 if the market-to-book ratio is above the 
sample median in the respective year and 0 otherwise. 
Datastream 
Worldscope 
governance Binary variable that equals 1 if the strength of firm’s corporate 
governance mechanisms is above the sample median in the respective 
year and 0 otherwise. The strength of a firm’s governance 
mechanisms is measured as the factor with the highest eigenvalue 
derived from a principal component analysis on the following 
standardized variables: board1 (whether the board has a policy for 
maintaining effective board functions), board2 (whether the company 
has a corporate governance board), board3 (whether the company has 




prior_discl Binary variable that equals 1 if the firm’s prior sustainability 
disclosure level is above the sample median in the respective year and 
0 otherwise. The firm’s prior sustainability disclosure level is 
measured as the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score in the prior year. 
Bloomberg 
media Binary variable that equals 1 is the number of negative media articles 
is above the sample median in the respective year and 0 otherwise. 
The number of negative media articles is measured as the number of 
articles that load for each firm-year and a given set of international 
newspapers on the following query in the Factiva database:   
Search query for environmental topics: ((ECOLOGY or EMISSION 
or WATER or ENVIRONMENTAL or OIL or WASTE or (PALM 
and OIL) or (NUCLEAR and POWER) or ENERGY) and (LEAK or 
Factiva 
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CONTROVERSY or DAMAGE or CRITICISM or RECALL or 
VIOLATION or crisis)) or POLLUTION or (LAND and 
CONTAMINATION) or (OIL and SPILL) or (WASTE and 
DISCHARGE) or (TOXIC and WASTE) or CONTAMINATION or 
ASBESTOS.  
Search query for social and human rights topics:  ((POOR or 
UNSAFE or UNFAIR) and (WORK or WORKING or 
EMPLOYMENT)) or (CHILD and LABOR) or (WORKER and 
DEATH) OR (SEXUAL and EXPLOITATION) or (LAND and 
GRAB) or (((TRADE and UNION) or WORKER or WORK OR 
LABOR or (HUMAN and RIGHT)) and (ABUSE or 
DISCRIMINATION or SUPPRESSION or REPRESSION or 
VIOLENCE OR CRTICISM or CONTROVERSY or DEATH or 
VIOLATION)). 
Control variables   
gri Dummy variable that equals “1” if the firm reports according to the 
GRI sustainability reporting guidelines, and “0” otherwise. 
Bloomberg 
report_length Length of the annual report, measured as the natural logarithm of the 
total number of words. 
Textual analysis 
size Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets at fiscal 
year-end, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
Datastream 
Worldscope 
roa Return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets at 
fiscal year-end, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
Datastream 
Worldscope 
lev Financial leverage of the firm measured as total debt divided by total 
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Table 3: Overview of the search queries for the construction of the disclosure measures 
Topic Search query Window size Score 
ghg_KPI (“tonne” OR “ton” OR “numeric”) 
AND  
(“GHG” or “*CO2*” OR “carbon” 
OR (“greenhouse” AND “gas”)) 
5 words binary score that reflects 
the presence (=1) versus 
absence (=0) of the 
information 
gender_KPI ((“female” OR “gender” OR 
“woman” or “sex”)  
AND  
(“board” OR “director” OR 





((“gender” AND “distribution”) OR 
(“gender” AND “split”) OR  
(“gender” AND “breakdown”) 
AND 
“numeric”) 
5 words binary score that reflects 
the presence (=1) versus 
absence (=0) of the 
information 
ghg_narrative (“ghg” AND “emission”) OR 
(“*CO2*” AND “emission”) OR 
(“carbon” AND “dioxide”) OR 
(“greenhouse” AND “gas”) OR 
(“climate” AND “change”) OR 
(“kyoto” AND “protocol”) OR 
(“global” AND “warming”) 
10 words continuous score based 
on the cosine similarity 
of each report with the 
words in the vocabulary 
gender_narrative (“gender” AND “split”) OR 
(“gender” AND “diversity”) OR 
(“gender” AND “distribution”) OR 
(“gender” AND “breakdown”) OR 
(“female” AND “manager”) OR 
(“woman” AND “manager”) OR 
(“female” AND “management”) OR 
(“woman” AND “management”) 
OR (“female” AND “director”) OR 
(“woman” AND “director”) OR 
(“female” AND “executive”) OR 
(“woman” AND “executive”) OR 
(“female” AND “board”) OR  
(“woman” AND “board”) 
10 words continuous score based 
on the cosine similarity 
of each report with the 
words in the vocabulary 
and  
hr_narrative (“human” AND “right”) 10 words continuous score based 
on the cosine similarity 
of each report with the 
words in the vocabulary  
“numeric” refers to Arabic numerals or quantitative words 
* denotes a wildcard 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for regression variables for the sample of treated and matched firms 
 mean sd min median max obs 
ghg_KPI 0.4853 0.4999 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2,417 
gender_KPI 0.2751 0.4467 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2,417 
ghg_narrative 1.7204 1.5791 0.0000 1.3413 11.3771 2,417 
gender_narrative 0.8744 0.8689 0.0000 0.5251 5.2856 2,417 
hr_narrative 1.2678 0.8381 0.0000 1.0992 4.9823 2,417 
post 0.5184 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 2,417 
treated 0.5139 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 2,417 
analysts (original) 15.66487 8.354534 0.0000 15.0000 44.0000 2417 
growth (original) 1.1287 1.1724 0.0100 0.8189 17.5935 2,417 
governance (original) 0.0000 1.0000 -2.0425 -0.4502 1.5380 2,417 
prior_discl (original) 30.4625 13.7369 6.1983 28.5124 75.6198 2,417 
media (original) 52.04179 522.8513 0.0000 6.0000 23,767 2417 
gri 0.2429 0.4289 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2,417 
report_length 11.1240 0.6417 0.0000 11.1260 12.7485 2,417 
size 8.2825 1.7830 4.5148 8.0596 13.9977 2,417 
roa 0.2084 0.3515 0.0000 0.1314 3.5798 2,417 
lev 0.2049 0.1707 0.0000 0.1803 0.8818 2,417 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the disclosure variables by year 
treated=1       
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ghg_KPI 0.7831 0.7513 0.7463 0.8517 0.9276 0.9039 
 (0.4133) (0.4334) (0.4362) (0.3563) (0.2597) (0.2953) 
gender_KPI 0.1587 0.3161 0.4080 0.6459 0.7738 0.7729 
 (0.3664) (0.4661) (0.4927) (0.4794) 0.4193) (0.4199) 
ghg_narrative 2.3792 2.4010 2.4783 2.7834 2.8968 2.6538 
 (1.6794) (1.6745) (1.6867) (1.7138) (1.5778) (1.4220) 
gender_narrative 0.9761 1.2887 1.4452 1.6683 1.7912 1.6720 
 (0.4927) (0.7756) (0.7912) (0.8514) (0.8114) (0.7948) 
hr_narrative 1.5975 1.6804 1.7331 1.8547 1.9274 1.8324 
 (0.6867) (0.7703) (0.7340) (0.8232) (0.7671) (0.7320) 
       
treated=0       
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ghg_KPI 0.1053 0.1399 0.1263 0.1263 0.1162 0.1010 
 (0.3077) (0.3478) (0.3330) (0.3330) (0.3212) (0.3021) 
gender_KPI 0.0053 0.0052 0.0051 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101 
 (0.0725) (0.0720) (0.0711) (0.1002) (0.1002) (0.1002) 
ghg_narrative 0.7252 0.7491 0.7877 0.7890 0.7939 0.8367 
 (0.7631) (0.7601) (0.8085) (0.8277) (0.7240) (0.7531) 
gender_narrative 0.2018 0.2109 0.2126 0.2200 0.2355 0.2569 
 (0.1561) (0.1837) (0.1642) (0.1733) (0.1871) (0.1807) 
hr_narrative 0.6529 0.6889 0.7259 0.7521 0.7531 0.7951 
 (0.4371) (0.5385) (0.4987) (0.5295) (0.5155) (0.5683) 
Panel C: Overview of the twenty most frequent words in the topic vocabularies 
  
ghg_narrative emission (40734), energy (30939), gas (24885), greenhouse (23165), change (20240), 
climate (19313), ghg (13931), renewable (12805), efficiency (10782), carbon (9431), 
reduction (6051), regulation (5222), dioxide (5108),  scope (4947), impact (4445), global 
(4442), fuel (4076), including (3977), report (3927), environmental (3783) 
  
gender_narrative diversity (6779), gender (6079), female (2466), director (2264), woman (1421), 
management (1117), include (985), male (938), executive (885), committee (736), 
employee (732), level (679), manager (639), report (538), split (492), year (433), 
policy (432), benefit (429), business (410), number (406) 
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hr_narrative right (14185), human (13765), policy (2195), principle (1964), business (1736), respect 
(1354), labour (1057), employee (1054), declaration (1033), community (923),  universal 
(921), issue (859), standard (767), support (717), risk (684), social (677), security (646), 
environmental (609), commitment (584), guiding (556) 
   
Panel A of this table presents descriptive statistics for the regression variables for the sample of treated and 
matched firms. Panel B shows the mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the disclosure 
variables by year for the treatment and control group separately. Panel C of this table presents the top twenty 
words and their frequency (in parentheses) in the topic vocabularies (i.e., the retrieved ten-word windows) for 
measuring the narrative disclosure. 
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Table 5: Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) 1.0000                 
                  
(2) 0.5140 1.0000                
 (0.0000)                 
(3) 0.6264 0.4401 1.0000               
 (0.0000) (0.0000)                
(4) 0.6122 0.6413 0.6607 1.0000              
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)               
(5) 0.5389 0.5048 0.6487 0.8328 1.0000             
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)              
(6) 0.0827 0.2675 0.0803 0.1648 0.0991 1.0000            
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)             
(7) 0.7126 0.5826 0.5789 0.7291 0.6257 0.0251 1.0000           
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2179)            
(8) 0.1658 0.1875 0.1197 0.1523 0.1934 0.0886 -0.0010 1.0000          
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9627)           
(9) 0.0968 0.0572 0.0808 0.0160 0.1146 0.0168 -0.0263 0.1944 1.0000         
 (0.0000) (0.0049) (0.0001) (0.4321) (0.0000) (0.4095) (0.1958) (0.0000)          
(10) -0.0284 0.0185 -0.0361 -0.0490 0.0334 0.0203 -0.1663 0.4669 0.3821 1.0000        
 (0.1630) (0.3634) (0.0760) (0.0159) (0.1009) (0.3183) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)         
(11) 0.0993 0.1423 0.0654 0.0714 -0.0161 0.0509 0.1511 -0.0389 0.0015 -0.0144 1.0000       
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.4283) (0.0122) (0.0000) (0.0561) (0.9398) (0.4802)        
(12) -0.0169 -0.0119 -0.0131 -0.1197 -0.1320 0.0399 -0.0672 -0.0237 0.0530 0.0121 0.0908 1.0000      
 (0.4054) (0.5575) (0.5212) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0500) (0.0009) (0.2444) (0.0092) (0.5536) (0.0000)       
(13) 0.0560 0.0877 0.0766 0.1076 0.1615 -0.0134 -0.0147 0.2238 0.2747 0.4760 -0.0608 -0.0060 1.0000     
 (0.0058) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5111) (0.4706) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0028) (0.7671)      
(14) -0.0435 -0.0200 -0.0460 0.0229 0.0553 -0.0003 -0.0227 -0.1709 -0.0172 -0.3912 -0.0891 -0.0956 0.0533 1.0000    
 (0.0324) (0.3249) (0.0238) (0.2610) (0.0066) (0.9868) (0.2645) (0.0000) (0.3991) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0087)     
(15) -0.4090 -0.2885 -0.3805 -0.3932 -0.3264 -0.0123 -0.5911 0.1710 0.1404 0.4229 -0.1064 0.0399 0.2110 -0.0948 1.0000   
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5455) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0496) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
(16) 0.3712 0.2854 0.3473 0.3197 0.3460 -0.0011 0.3441 0.1541 0.4184 0.2509 0.0228 0.0349 0.2363 -0.0468 -0.1817 1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9579) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2623) (0.0862) (0.0000) (0.0215) (0.0000)   
(17) 0.0672 0.0585 0.0358 0.0594 0.0904 0.0002 -0.0308 0.2757 0.3322 0.5282 -0.1291 0.0235 0.4271 -0.0717 0.1920 0.2752 1.0000 
 (0.0009) (0.0040) (0.0785) (0.0035) (0.0000) (0.9919) (0.1300) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2478) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
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This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) for a two-tailed test of statistical significance.  
(1) ghg_KPI, (2) gender_KPI, (3) ghg_narrative (4) gender_narrative, (5) hr_narrative, (6) post, (7) treated, (8) report_length, (9) gri, (10) size, (11) roa, (12) lev, (13) analysts, 
(14) growth, (15) governance, (16) prior_discl, 17 (media)
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Table 6: Univariate difference-in-differences analysis 
 
ghg_KPI     
 post=0 post=1  
 (a) (b) (b) – (a) 
treated=0 (i) 0.1239 0.1145 -0.0094 
treated=1 (ii) 0.7599 0.8953 0.1354 *** 
 (ii) – (i) 0.6360 *** 0.7808 *** 0.1448 *** 
    
gender_KPI     
 post=0 post=1  
 (a) (b) (b) – (a) 
treated=0 (i) 0.0052 0.0101 0.0049 
treated=1 (ii) 0.2967 0.7329 0.4362 *** 
 (ii) – (i) 0.2915 *** 0.7228 *** 0.4313 *** 
    
ghg_narrative     
 post=0 post=1  
 (a) (b) (b) – (a) 
treated=0 (i) 0.7545 0.8065 0.0521 
treated=1 (ii) 2.4205 2.7764 0.3558 *** 
 (ii) – (i) 1.6661 *** 1.9698 *** 0.3039 *** 
    
gender_narrative     
 post=0 post=1  
 (a) (b) (b) – (a) 
treated=0 (i) 0.2085 0.2375 0.0290 *** 
treated=1 (ii) 1.2413 1.7108 0.4695 *** 
 (ii) – (i) 1.0328 *** 1.4733 *** 0.4405 *** 
    
hr_narrative     
 post=0 post=1  
 (a) (b) (b) – (a) 
treated=0 (i) 0.6898 0.7668 0.0770 ** 
treated=1 (ii) 1.6717 1.8713 0.1996 *** 
 (ii) – (i) 0.9819 *** 1.1045 *** 0.1226 ** 
This table presents the results from univariate difference-in-differences analysis. The table reports mean values 
of the dependent variables ghg_KPI, gender_KPI, ghg_narrative, gender_narrative, and hr_narrative. The 
sample is n=581 for treated=0 and post=0, n=594 for treated=0 and post=1, n=583 for treated=1 and post=0 and 
n=659 for treated=1 and post=1. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, based on two-sided t-tests. We assess the statistical significance of the difference-in-differences 
values by comparing the mean values of firm-level pre/post changes in the dependent variables across treated 
and non-treated firms using t-tests. 
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Table 7: Results of the regression analyses with moderating variables and firm-fixed effects 
 ghg_KPI gender_KPI ghg_narrative gender_narrative hr_narrative 
incentive=analysts:         
treated 0.5784 *** 0.2121 *** 1.4290 *** 0.8798 *** 0.9265 *** 
 (12.9276)  (7.0451)  (9.1107)  (16.5051)  (13.5597)  
postxtreated 0.1879 *** 0.4304 *** 0.4475 *** 0.4481 *** 0.1323 *** 
 (4.3092)  (10.5333)  (4.4538)  (8.9571)  (2.6238)  
incentive -0.0460  -0.0077  -0.0436  0.0573  0.0940  
 (-1.1723)  (-0.5169)  (-0.4331)  (1.6036)  (1.4099)  
postxincentive 0.0635 * -0.0011  0.1789 ** 0.0156  0.0806 * 
 (1.8120)  (-0.1361)  (2.5475)  (0.9241)  (1.8250)  
treatedxincentive 0.1378 ** 0.1671 *** 0.4931 ** 0.3022 *** 0.1498  
 (2.3419)  (3.6421)  (2.1298)  (3.6721)  (1.4343)  
postxtreatedxincentive -0.1153 ** -0.0116  -0.3056 ** -0.0238  -0.0136  
 (-2.0479)  (-0.2076)  (-2.0176)  (-0.2729)  (-0.1526)  
R-squared 0.5538  0.5096  0.3687  0.6171  0.4780  
incentive=growth:           
treated 0.6782 *** 0.3362 *** 1.8311 *** 1.0844 *** 0.9272 *** 
 (17.1681)  (10.2907)  (10.0503)  (16.0683)  (11.2970)  
postxtreated 0.1022 *** 0.4006 *** 0.2743 *** 0.3480 *** 0.1765 *** 
 (2.7988)  (10.9185)  (2.9553)  (6.0972)  (3.1225)  
incentive -0.0020  0.0552 *** 0.0382  0.0895 *** 0.0569  
 (-0.0506)  (3.7930)  (0.3591)  (2.9462)  (1.0228)  
postxincentive 0.0271  0.0183 * 0.0419  0.0327 * 0.1184 ** 
 (0.7632)  (1.8334)  (0.7006)  (1.8891)  (2.5466)  
treatedxincentive -0.0619  -0.0603  -0.2858  -0.0452  0.2228 ** 
 (-1.0864)  (-1.3556)  (-1.3475)  (-0.5414)  (2.1659)  
postxtreatedxincentive 0.0552  0.0324  -0.0041  0.1377 * -0.1322  
 (0.9508)  (0.6008)  (-0.0248)  (1.7652)  (-1.5676)  
R-squared 0.5522  0.4998  0.3645  0.6046  0.4777  
incentive=governance:          
treated 0.6726 *** 0.2341 *** 1.7242 *** 1.0063 *** 1.0327 *** 
 (15.6639)  (9.2946)  (10.1250)  (19.6529)  (14.5336)  
postxtreated 0.1075 *** 0.4285 *** 0.3113 *** 0.4729 *** 0.1301 *** 
 (2.7665)  (12.2376)  (3.6698)  (10.0156)  (2.6546)  
incentive 0.0152  -0.0474 *** -0.1044  -0.0094  0.0074  
 (0.3550)  (-3.0956)  (-0.7289)  (-0.2487)  (0.1102)  
postxincentive -0.0399  -0.0061  -0.0298  0.0186  0.0124  
 (-1.1913)  (-0.4052)  (-0.5417)  (0.9135)  (0.3183)  
treatedxincentive -0.0646  0.1964 *** -0.3611  0.2017 * -0.0171  
 (-0.9745)  (3.0779)  (-1.4756)  (1.7332)  (-0.1351)  
postxtreatedxincentive -0.0008  -0.0877  -0.1947  -0.2504 *** -0.0928  
 (-0.0123)  (-1.3192)  (-1.4514)  (-2.6315)  (-0.9375)  
R-squared 0.5528  0.5026  0.3727  0.6014  0.4648  
observations 2,417  2,417  2,417  2,417  2,417  
controls YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
firm cluster YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
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Table 7: cont’d 
 ghg_KPI gender_KPI ghg_narrative gender_narrative hr_narrative 
incentive=prior_discl:           
treated 0.5988 *** 0.2112 *** 1.3346 *** 0.9601 *** 0.9012 *** 
 (13.5872)  (6.2320)  (10.5500)  (14.7595)  (12.4150)  
postxtreated 0.1809 *** 0.4294 *** 0.1751 * 0.3518 *** 0.0507  
 (3.5725)  (8.8147)  (1.6662)  (4.9961)  (0.7412)  
incentive 0.0634 * -0.0163  0.1421  0.0214  0.0093  
 (1.7490)  (-0.8152)  (1.4118)  (0.5961)  (0.1629)  
postxincentive 0.1168 *** -0.0073  0.1589 ** 0.0212  0.0793  
 (2.9326)  (-0.4784)  (2.0536)  (0.6992)  (1.2849)  
treatedxincentive 0.0368  0.1420 *** 0.4365 ** 0.1208 * 0.1680 ** 
 (0.6572)  (3.1966)  (2.4879)  (1.6934)  (2.1233)  
postxtreatedxincentive -0.1440 ** -0.0166  0.0550  0.0766  0.0332  
 (-2.2410)  (-0.2941)  (0.3679)  (0.7692)  (0.3240)  
R-squared 0.5594  0.5041  0.3828  0.6049  0.4731  
incentive=media:           
treated 0.6287 *** 0.2424 *** 1.5988 *** 0.9626 *** 1.0206 *** 
 (15.4338)  (8.7438)  (9.8735)  (18.5837)  (14.9101)  
postxtreated 0.1584 *** 0.4259 *** 0.3019 *** 0.4343 *** 0.0963 * 
 (3.9274)  (10.3934)  (2.6754)  (8.6427)  (1.6543)  
incentive 0.0219  -0.0322 ** -0.0437  0.0260  0.0127  
 (0.6604)  (-2.0313)  (-0.4402)  (0.7321)  (0.2110) 
postxincentive 0.0221  0.0032  -0.0208  0.0045  0.0135 
 (0.6638)  (0.3354)  (-0.2498)  (0.2296)  (0.2524) 
treatedxincentive 0.0364  0.1201 *** 0.1935  0.1720 ** 0.0020 
 (0.6477)  (2.7034)  (0.8747)  (2.1376)  (0.0212) 
postxtreatedxincentive -0.0617  -0.0236  -0.0580  -0.0522  0.0140  
 (-1.1254)  (-0.4193)  (-0.3254)  (-0.6477)  (0.1516)  
R-squared 0.5521  0.5009  0.3627  0.6034  0.4645  
           
observations 2,417  2,417  2,417  2,417  2,417  
controls YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
firm cluster YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
This table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on OLS regressions with standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 8: Results of the regression analyses with separate interaction terms for each year 
 ghg_KPI gender_KPI ghg_narrative gender_narrative hr_narrative 
           
2011xtreated -0.0652 * 0.1604 *** -0.0016 0.3056 *** 0.0440 
 (-1.7720) (4.3683) (-0.0222) (7.8832) (0.9833) 
2012xtreated -0.0754 * 0.2389 *** -0.0057 0.4339 *** 0.0292 
 (-1.8424) (6.3648) (-0.0713) (9.8063) (0.6326) 
2013xtreated 0.0256 0.4684 *** 0.2888 *** 0.6361 *** 0.1122 ** 
 (0.6128) (11.2284) (3.1851) (12.0740) (2.0440) 
2014xtreated 0.1114 *** 0.5902 *** 0.4048 *** 0.7455 *** 0.2007 *** 
 (3.0103) (15.2744) (4.2637) (13.7468) (3.4738) 
2015xtreated 0.1076 *** 0.5926 *** 0.1308 0.6069 *** 0.0701 
 (2.6166) (14.9681) (1.2764) (11.3164) (1.1427) 
          
observations 2,417  2,417 2,417  2,417  2,417  
R-squared 0.5523  0.5050 0.3626  0.6053  0.4649  
controls YES  YES YES  YES  YES  
year FE YES  YES YES  YES  YES  
firm cluster YES  YES YES  YES  YES  
This table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on OLS regressions with standard 
errors clustered at the firm level for the parsimonious model without moderating effects and year-specific 
interactions instead of postxtreated. All analyses are presented for the sample of treated and matched firms 
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Table 9: Results of the regression analyses for alternative disclosure measures 
Panel A: Correlation matrix for topic-specific disclosure measures based on word counts  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
(1) ghg_narrative 1.0000      
       
(2) gender_narrative 0.6607 1.0000      
 (0.0000)      
(3) hr_narrative 0.6487 0.8328 1.0000     
 (0.0000) (0.0000)      
(4) count_ENV 0.4212 0.0871 0.1348 1.0000    
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
(5) count_EMPL 0.1595 0.3093 0.3490 0.0816 1.0000   
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)    
(6) count_HR 0.1337 0.2802 0.3022 0.1071 0.8675 1.0000   
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
(7) count_SOC 0.0596 0.0974 0.1835 0.2075 0.5774 0.6348 1.0000  
 (0.0034) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
       
Panel B: Results for topic-specific disclosure measures based on word counts 
 count_ENV count_EMPL count_HR count_SOC 
       
postxtreated 0.0008 0.0026 * 0.0024 *** 0.0007  
 (0.8636) (1.6822)  (3.1953) (0.8073)  
      
observations 2,417 2,417  2,417 2,417  
controls YES YES  YES YES  
year FE YES YES  YES YES  
firm cluster YES YES  YES YES  
 
Panel C. Results for other textual attributes 
 tone readability ratio_numbers length 
     
postxtreated 0.0002 0.0827 *** 0.1398 *** 0.2028 *** 
 (0.6379) (6.1783) (3.9601) (4.9292) 
       
observations 2,417 2,417  2,417 2,417  
controls YES YES  YES YES  
year FE YES YES  YES YES  
firm cluster YES YES  YES YES  
Panel A of this table presents Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) for a two-tailed test 
of statistical significance. Panel B of this table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from 
OLS regressions for the disclosure measures that are constructed based on the frequency of words from the 
sustainability dictionary developed by Pencle and Mălăescu (2016). Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. Panel C of this table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from OLS regressions for 
textual attributes. All analyses are presented for the sample of treated and matched firms (n=2,417) and refer to 
the parsimonious model without moderating effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
  




Details on the construction of the disclosure measures  
General procedure analogous to Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) and Hummel et al. (2017) 
The construction of KPI disclosure measures: 
1. For each topic, we query according to predefined logical expressions across all 
documents. In particular, with respect to disclosure of 
a) GHG emissions, the following logical expression is used for the search query: 
(“tonne” OR “ton” OR “numeric”) AND (“GHG” or “*CO2*” OR “carbon” OR 
(“greenhouse” AND “gas”)) 
b) gender distribution, the following logical expression is used for the search query: 
((“female” OR “gender” OR “woman” or “sex”) AND (“board” OR “director” OR 
“executive” OR “manager” or “employee”) AND “numeric”) OR ((“gender” AND 
“distribution”) OR (“gender” AND “split”) OR (“gender” AND “breakdown”) AND 
“numeric”)  
2. ghg_KPI and gender_KPI take on the value of “1” if the report loads on the search 
query and “0” otherwise. 
The construction of topic-specific narrative disclosure measures: 
1. Let N denote the number of unique words in the entire corpus. 
2. For each topic, we query according to predefined logical expressions across all 
documents. In particular, with respect to disclosure on 
a) GHG emissions, the following logical expression is used for the search query: 
(“ghg” AND “emission”) OR (“*CO2*” AND “emission”) OR (“carbon” AND 
“dioxide”) OR (“greenhouse” AND “gas”) OR (“climate” AND “change”) OR 
(“kyoto” AND “protocol”) OR (“global” AND “warming”)  
b) gender distribution, the following logical expression is used for the search query: 
(“gender” AND “split”) OR (“gender” AND “diversity”) OR (“gender” AND 
“distribution”) OR (“gender” AND “breakdown”) OR (“female” AND “manager”) 
OR (“woman” AND “manager”) OR (“female” AND “management”) OR (“woman” 
AND “management”) OR (“female” AND “director”) OR (“woman” AND 
“director”) OR (“female” AND “executive”) OR (“woman” AND “executive”) OR 
(“female” AND “board”) OR (“woman” AND “board”) 
c) human rights, the following logical expression is used for the search query: 
“human” AND “right” 
3. For each topic, we aggregate all retrieved ten-word windows into a topic-specific 
vocabulary list. The vocabulary list includes all words that appear in all retrieved ten-
word windows for each topic. 
4. For each topic, we define an N-vector search that is filled with the term -frequency-
inverse-document-frequency (tf-idf) of each word in the topic vocabulary corresponding 
to each of the N elements. 
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5. For each firm i in each year t, we define an N-vector texti, t that is filled with the tf-idf 




6. For each element of the N-vector, the inverse-document-frequency (idf) is calculated 
according to 
(1) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2 𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓 
 where  n: number of all documents 
   f: number of documents in which the word appears 
7. For each element of the N-vector search, the tf-idf is calculated as the product of the 
number of times the word appears in the training set and the idf. 
8. For each element of the N-vector texti, t, the tf-idf is calculated as the product of the 
number of times the word appears in the annual report of firm i in year t (i.e., the term 
frequency) and the idf. 
9. To neutralize the impact of the document length, we normalize the N-vector search 
according to  
(2) 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ√𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ∙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ 
10. Similarly, we normalize the N-vector texti, t according to 
(3) 𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∙𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
11. To obtain the similarity between firm i’s annual disclosure in year t and the topic 
vocabulary, we calculate similarityi, t as the cosine similarity (i.e., the dot product) 
between normi, t and search_norm. 
(4) 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 
12. For conventional reasons, the cosine similarity is multiplied by 100. 
  
                                                          
38 
Note that Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) simply use a vector of word counts (i.e., the term frequency) instead 
of the tf-idf. In contrast, the tf-idf incorporates a term weighting procedure (i.e., the inverse document frequency) 
and adjusts a word’s weight based on how (un)usual the word is. It thus reflects the importance of a word in a 
specific document relative to the importance of that word in the entire corpus. The more unusual the word, the 
higher the weight (Loughran and McDonald 2016).
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A simple example for the calculation of the cosine similarity (analogous to Hummel et al. 
(2017)) 
1. Consider three texts that, after application of the preprocessing methods, can be described 
according to the following word lists: 
text_1 =  [“employee”, “educate”, “women”] 
text_2 =  [“engage, “board”, “gender”, “composition”, “women”] 
text_3 =  [“board”, “composition”, “engage”, “educate”, “women”] 
2. Consider the following training set (as a result of the search query): 
search =  [“gender”, “board”, “women”] 
3. The corpus is given by 
corpus =  [“gender”, “board”, “women”, “composition”, “engage”, “employee”, 
“educate”] 
4. The inverse-document-frequency for each word corresponds to 
wgender  = 1.5850 
wboard = 0.5850 
wwomen  = 0.0000 
wcomposition  = 0.5850 
wengage  = 0.5850 
wemployee  = 1.5850 
weducate  = 0.5850 
5. The tfidf-vector for the training set and each text corresponds to 
search =  [1.5850, 0.5850, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0] 
text_1 =  [0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.5850, 0.5850] 
text_2 =  [1.5850, 0.5850, 0.0, 0.5850, 0.5850, 0.0, 0.0] 
text_3 =  [0.0, 0.5850, 0.0, 0.5850, 0.5850, 0.0, 0.5850] 
6. The normalized tfidf-vector for the training set and each text corresponds to 
norm_search =  [0.9381, 0.3462, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0] 
norm_text_1 =  [0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.9381, 0.3462] 
norm_text_2 =  [0.8426, 0.311, 0.0, 0.311, 0.311, 0.0, 0.0] 
norm_text_3 =  [0.0, 0.5, 0.0, 0.5, 0.5, 0.0, 0.5] 
7. The cosine similarity for each text corresponds to 
similarity_text_1 = norm_search ∙ norm_text_1 = 0.0000 
similarity_text_2 = norm_search ∙ norm_text_2 = 0.8981 
similarity_text_3 = norm_search ∙ norm_text_3 = 0.1731 
  




Examples of incorrect classifications with regard to ghg_KPI and gender_KPI 
We manually checked the validity of the disclosure measures, particularly with regard to the 
disclosure of key performance indicators. The results indicate that the textual analysis might 
not correctly identify the disclosure of the key performance indicators in some cases. The 
following table provides examples of incorrect classifications. 
 
Firm and year Results from 
textual analysis 
Corresponding word window 
CIK=27904, year=2015 ghg_KPI=1 In addition, at the 38th ICAO Assembly that 
concluded on October 4, 2013 in Montreal, the 
Assembly adopted a climate change resolution 
committing ICAO to develop a global market-based 
measure to be finalized at the 2016 ICAO Assembly 
that would enable the airline industry to achieve 
carbon-neutral growth by 2020. 
CIK=4447, year=2015 ghg_KPI=1 Excludes approximately 255 million mcf of carbon 
dioxide gas for sale or use in company operations. 
ISIN=GB0009223206, 
year=2014 
ghg_KPI=0 Reported in table on page 41. 
ISIN=GB00B1L5QH97, 
year=2015 
ghg_KPI=0 Reported in table on page 37. 
CIK=1037976, year=2015 gender_KPI=1 During 2015, we were recognized for excellence in 
global corporate governance by the India Institute of 
Directors and for gender diversity on our Board of 
Directors by the 2020 Women on Boards. 
CIK=1005817, year=2011 gender_KPI=1 1.5        Surviving Spouse means the spouse of the 
Executive surviving on the date of death of the 
Executive. 
1.6      The masculine gender, where it appears in this 
Agreement, will be deemed to include the feminine 
gender, and the singular may include the plural, 
unless the context clearly indicates the contrary. 
ISIN=GB00BJ62K685, 
year=2014 
gender_KPI=0 Reported in table on page 55. 
ISIN=GB0004228648, 
year=2015 
gender_KPI=0 The Company has no employees. Its board is made 
up of five directors, all male.  
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